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4Introduction
This thesis is composed of three chapters. While chapter 1 stands on it’s own,
chapters 2 and 3 are related in topic and grew out of two parts of a single paper.
Hence, even though they constitute largely independent treatments of separate
questions they have a unique introduction and conclusion.
Chapter 1 considers a dynamic tournament setting where feedback gives agents
the possibility to learn about the productivity of a technology they are using. If
the technology proves unsatisfactory, they have the possibility of switching to a
different one. However, it is shown that full feedback does not lead to the efficient
technology choice in a tournament setting. Risk neutral agents will behave as risk
averse in some cases and risk loving in others. It is shown that the inefficiency
can be ameliorated by giving the later period more weight for the allocation of
the tournament prize. In a setting with effort. feedback will induce the agents
to exert higher effort in the presence of learning. Finally, the efficient technology
choice can be achieved using partial feedback.
Chapters 2 and 3 investigate the phenomenon of kindness towards strangers.
Seemingly altruistic behaviour can follow from purely selfish motives if agents face
risk. In a repeated dictator game setting, a charitable equilibrium can be sustained
if dictators have a positive probability to change roles, even with anonymous
transactions. This also holds if behaviour cannot be monitored perfectly. The
main driving factor for charitable behaviour is the desire to sustain the social
norm of kindness, from which the charitable agent herself might benefit in the
future. This can be interpreted as an informal insurance arrangement in the
absence of enforceable contracts. Furthermore, we examine how cooperation is
complicated by inequality, in terms of heterogeneous risk exposure. We study how
more persistent differences in risk make cooperation increasingly hard to achieve.
Moreover, heterogeneity can lead to a fragmentation of society, where cooperation
is only possible within subgroups, leading to losses in welfare. The model allows for
interesting interpretations of social divisions in societies of varying heterogeneity.
5Chapter 1. Feedback and Learning in Tournaments
1. Introduction
This paper studies feedback in dynamic tournaments and the resulting beha-
viour of the competitors. Tournaments are competitions were the rewards of
competitors depends on their ranking in relation to each other rather than solely
on individual performance. Tournaments are pervasive in economic and social
settings. Employees compete for a promotion, assistant professors compete for a
limited number of tenured positions, students compete to be on top of their class,
athletes compete for medals and research teams compete for patents in R&D races.
This paper studies the optimal design of dynamic tournaments that last over
more than one period. The studies settings where the competitors have a choice
between different strategies, projects or technologies. They can learn about their
quality and possibly switch to a different strategy during the tournament. While
the literature on tournaments has largely focused on the amount of effort agents
provide in a tournament, i.e. how hard they work, this paper focuses on learning
and strategy choice of agents, i.e. how they work.
There are various reasons for the existence of tournaments. In the presence
of large correlated shocks tournaments can be an optimal incentive mechanism.
In other cases, tournaments are the only possible mechanism. This can be the
case if there is imperfect monitoring, such that only the rank order of agents is
observable but not a measure of individual performance. If the performance of
the agents is not verifiable, e.g. when it is subject to the subjective judgement
of a principal, tournaments may be the only credible incentive mechanism. Fur-
thermore there are situations where tournaments are not optimal but externally
imposed. This can be the case if there is only a limited number of indivisible
prizes as with promotions and sometimes tenured positions. Another example is
when the competitors genuinely care about the rank order itself as with student
rankings or sports competitions.
6The earliest theoretical contributions considered mostly static tournaments.
Lazear and Rosen (1981), Green and Stokey (1983) as well as Nalebuff and Stiglitz
(1983) compare the efficiency of tournaments and individual incentive contracts.
They find that tournaments can be superior for risk-averse agents in the presence
of unobserved correlated shocks.
More recently, a literature considering dynamic tournaments has emerged. If
agents exert effort over time, the principal has to decide various aspects in the
design of the tournament. First, there is the decision whether to monitor interim
performance. Aoyagi (2010); Ederer (2010) and Goltsman and Mukherjee (2011)
study whether the principal should then give feedback during the tournaments and
reveal the interim results to the agents. Aoyagi finds that either a policy of full
feedback, where the principal publicly reveals output, or a policy of no feedback
at all will be optimal, depending on the shape of agent’s cost function. Ederer
considers a setting where agents differ in ability and restricts his consideration to
the alternative policies of full and no feedback. Likewise he finds that the curvature
of the cost function determines which policy is superior in a setting where ability
enters additively in the production function. When ability enters multiplicatively
the outcome of a full feedback policy improves due to efficient sorting. Goltsman
and Mukherjee find that partial feedback is optimal in a setting with a binary
output. Gershkov and Perry (2009) study whether the principal should conduct a
midterm review and how much weight it should carry. The feedback policy is fixed
as it is assumed that the result of the midterm review is public. They find that
it is always optimal to conduct a midterm review given the correct aggregation
rule for midterm review and final outcome. According to the optimal aggregation
rule, the second period weight should increase with the effect of first period effort
on final output.
There exists a related literature on feedback in single agent settings. Lizzeri
et al. (2002) finds that it is often not optimal to give feedback Given optimal
incentives effort can be induced more cheaply without effort. Fuchs (2006) studies
a setting where output is privately observed by the principal over multiple periods
7and also finds that it might be optimal not to provide any feedback. Instead the
agent is fired if output falls below a threshold.
The existing literature almost exclusively focuses on efficiency of tournaments
and feedback mechanisms in incentivising effort. In addition, Ederer considers
that feedback allows agents to learn about their ability. However, a different
function of feedback is largely ignored by the economics literature. Feedback
allows agents not only to learn about their basic ability. Feedback also allows the
agents to assess if a strategy, project or technology they are using is suitable or if
it should be changed. This question is relevant in many settings. Students might
reconsider their strategy for studying after a low mark in a midterm test, assistant
professors might reconsider their research topic, investment bankers could adjust
their portfolio and R&D teams might change their method. Indeed this aspect is
often acknowledged, but seen as unproblematic1 or is at least not considered in
detail2. This paper provides a more thorough analysis of feedback and strategy
choice in tournament settings. This issue is related to a growing literature on
incentivising learning and innovation.3
While the literature on feedback and tournaments has largely assessed feedback
negatively or at least ambiguously, taking into account the importance of feedback
for learning and adjusting strategies leads to a more favourable view. Without
feedback, learning about the the quality of the technology used is impossible.
However, it is shown that there can be inefficiencies not only of effort but also of
strategy choice in a tournament setting. With full feedback agents might choose
inefficiently risky or inefficiently safe technologies. This could provide an explan-
ation for investment bankers investing in overly risky projects in a competitive
1Lizzeri et al. (p.2) write: “To the extent that providing feedback on performance helps indi-
viduals do their jobs better, or plan their futures better, it is beneficial. But what effects does
performance feedback have on incentives and motivation?”
2Nalebuff and Stiglitz mention that competitive compensation schemes can potentially induce
risk-averse agents to choose riskier techniques, but they do not explicitly analyse this aspect in
the context of tournaments.
3See e.g. Manso (2011) for optimal contracts with a single agent or Ederer (2013) for multiple
agents and also Moscarini and Squintani (2010); Halac et al. (2012); Gomes et al. (2013) and
Kremer et al. (2013).
8setting or why assistant professors might stick with a known but not very fruit-
ful research topic instead of exploring a new one. Furthermore, it is shown that
inefficiencies in technology choice can be ameliorated by putting greater weight
on later periods. This could provide a rationale for being more lenient with a be-
ginner and giving the results of the first period less importance for the allocation
of the prize. Lastly, if partial feedback is possible, the principal can induce the
optimal technology choice by giving recommendations.
Section 2 introduces the problem of inefficient strategy choice in a basic model.
Section 3 considers the optimal allocation rule for the prize. Section 4 then ex-
amines the interaction between strategy choice and effort in settings with and
without effort. Finally, section 5 studies strategy choice under partial feedback.
2. Basic Model
In the basic model we contrast the extreme policies of full public feedback and
no feedback at all. Two agents (i = a, b) compete in a tournament over two periods
(t = 1, 2) for a fixed prize of 1. In each period the agents choose a technology from
a continuum of ex ante identical technologies, with productivity θ ∼ N (µ, σ2).
The first period output of agent i is xi1 = θi1 + εi1, the sum of the productivity
of their chosen technology and the error term εi ∼ N (0, 1). Before the second
period the agents choose whether to keep the tested technology or to switch to
a new one. Second period output is then simply the productivity of the used
technology: xi2 = θi2. The prize goes to the agent with the higher total output
xi = xi1 + xi2 = θi1 + εi1 + θi2. The principal privately observes the output and
decides whether to give the agents feedback after period 1 and publicly disclose
xa1, x
b
1.4 The principal is risk neutral and maximises aggregate total output xa+xb.
The agents are risk neutral. Before the second period the agents choose an action
ai {K,S}. They choose whether to keep (K) the tested technology (θi2 = θiK) or
to switch (S) to a new one (θi2 = θiS) to maximise their expected payoff which is
4In order to keep the problem tractable it is assumed that the principal can commit to giving
truthful feedback. This is relaxed in Section5. See Goltsman and Mukherjee (2011) for the
optimal partial feedback in a setting without learning and with a binary outcome.
9equal to the probability of winning
U i = Pr
(
xi > xj
)
= F∆x (0) ,
where ∆x1 = xi1 − xj1. If the agents do not receive feedback, they clearly
cannot condition their switching decision on the first period output. For K: ∆x ∼
N (0, 8σ2 + 2), while for S: ∆x ∼ N (0, 4σ2 + 2). The probability of winning with
K and S is always 12 . Hence the agents are indifferent. It is assumed that agents
switch as their output has lower variance.
If the agents receive feedback, they update their beliefs about the used techno-
logies.
Remark 1. 5 The updated distribution of θi1 after learning xi1 is:
(
θi1
∣∣∣xi1) ∼ N
(
µ+ σ2xi1
1 + σ2 ,
σ2
1 + σ2
)
.
If the agents switch to a new technology , it has again the original distribution
N (µ, σ2). The probability of winning is:
Pr
(
xi > xj
∣∣∣xi1, xj1) = Pr (∆θ2 < ∆x1 |∆x1 ) = F∆θ2 [∆x1] ,
where ∆θ2 = θj2 − θi26. The agents choose S over K if this gives a higher
probability of winning:
F(θj2−θiS) (∆x1) ≥ F(θj2−θiK) (∆x1)
It will be shown, that optimal decision depends on the action of the competitor,
agent j.
Given agent j chooses S. In the following we write θjS−θiK = ∆θKS and F(θjS−θiK) =
FKS, where agent i chooses S and agent j chooses K and analogously for other
combinations. Given agent j chooses S, agent i prefers S as well if this gives a
higher probability of winning, otherwise agent i chooses K:
5Derivation in Appendix A.1
6Note the opposing order of i and j in ∆θ2 = θj2 − θi2 and ∆x1 = xi1 − xj1.
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Figure 1. Probability of winning for agent i, given agent j
switches. (For µ = 1, σ = 2, xj1 = 0.)
FSS [∆x1] ≥ FKS [∆x1]
⇒ Φ
(
∆x1√
2σ
)
≥ Φ
∆x1 − σ
2(µ−xi1)
1+σ2
σ
√
1 + 11+σ2

Since ∆θSS ∼ N (0, 2σ2) and ∆θKS ∼ N
(
σ2(µ−xi1)
1+σ2 , σ
2
(
1 + 11+σ2
))
. Otherwise
agent i prefers to keep the tried technology. The respective probabilities of winning
can be seen in figure 1.
Since Φ, the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the standard normal
distribution is monotonically increasing, this is equivalent to:
⇒ ∆x1√
2σ
≥ ∆x1 −
σ2(µ−xi1)
1+σ2
σ
√
1 + 11+σ2
⇒ xi1 ≤
xj1 + µ
(
2 +
√
2 + 21+σ2
)
3 +
√
2 + 21+σ2
11
This gives a critical value for the first period output of agent i, xiS∗1
(
xj1
)
=
xj1+µ
(
2+
√
2+ 21+σ2
)
3+
√
2+ 21+σ2
, conditional on agent j switching. Below xiS∗1
(
xj1
)
agent i
prefers S while above they prefer K. The gradient of xiS∗1
(
xj1
)
is 15 for σ = 0
and the limit is 13+√2 for σ →∞.
Given agent j chooses K. Given agent j chooses K, agent i prefers S if:
FSK [∆x1] ≥ FKK [∆x1]
⇒ Φ
∆x1 − σ
2(xj1−µ)
1+σ2
σ
√
1 + 11+σ2
 ≥ Φ
∆x1 − σ
2(xj1−xi1)
1+σ2√
2 σ21+σ2

⇒ xi1 ≤
xj1 (1 + 2σ2) + µ
[
2 +
√
2 (2 + σ2)
]
3 + 2σ2 +
√
2 (2 + σ2)
Since ∆θSK ∼ N
(
σ2(xj1−µ)
1+σ2 , σ
2
(
1 + 11+σ2
))
and ∆θKK ∼ N
(
µ− µ+σ2xi11+σ2 , σ2 + σ
2
1+σ2
)
.
Otherwise agent i prefers to keep the tried technology. This gives a critical value
for the first period output of agent i, xiK∗1
(
xj1
)
=
xj1(1+2σ2)+µ
[
2+
√
2(2+σ2)
]
3+2σ2+
√
2(2+σ2)
, con-
ditional on agent j keeping. Below xiK∗1
(
xj1
)
agent i prefers S while above they
prefer K.
The gradient of xiK∗1
(
xj1
)
is 15 for σ = 0 and the limit is 1 for σ → ∞. At the
point xi1 = x
j
1 = µ we have xiS∗1 = xiK∗1 , so both agents are indifferent between S
and K at this point.
Equilibrium. All four critical value functions can be seen in figure 2.
In equilibrium, agent i prefers S if :
xi1 ≤

xiS∗1
(
xj1
)
and xj1 ≤ xjS∗1
(
xj1
)
(agent j switches and expects i to switch)
xiK∗1
(
xj1
)
and xj1 > xjS∗1
(
xj1
)
(agent j keeps and expects i to switch).
Agent i prefers K if:
xi1 >

xiS∗1
(
xj1
)
and xj1 ≤ xjK∗1
(
xj1
)
(agent j switches and expects i to keep)
xiK∗1
(
xj1
)
and xj1 > xjK∗1
(
xj1
)
(agent j keeps and expects i to keep).
12
-10 -5 5 10
xa1
-10
-5
5
10
xb1
xaS1
xaK1
xbS1
xbK1
Figure 2. All critical values. (For µ = 1, σ = 2.)
This equilibrium is unique, since gradients of xiS∗1
(
xj1
)
, xiK∗1
(
xj1
)
are less or
equal to 1 for σ (0,∞), such that the order never changes.7
In equilibrium, the critical values can be simplified to:
xi∗1
(
xj1
)
=

xiS∗1
(
xj1
)
if xj1 ≤ µ
xiK∗1
(
xj1
)
if xj1 ≤ µ.
Thus, agent i prefers S if xi1 ≤ xi∗1 and K otherwise. The resulting relevant
critical value functions for both agents can be seen in figure 3.
In order to maximise output, agent i should switch when output is below the ex-
pectation (xi1 ≤ µ) and keep the tested technology when it’s above, independently
from the output of agent j. Hence, the behaviour of the agents is not optimal from
the perspective of the principal. The divergence of the blue line from a horizontal
line and of the purple line of a vertical line through µ in figure 3 represents this
inefficiency.
Figure 4 shows the regions of inefficient switching for agent i. In region A agent
i inefficiently chooses K, even though output is below the expectation µ. This is
7Specifically, where xi1
(
xiS∗1
(
xj1
)
, xiK∗1
(
xj1
))
, i.e. the decision between S and K
depends on the decision of the competitor, we always have either that the com-
petitor would choose S
[
xj1 < x
jS∗
1
(
xj1
)
and xj1 < x
jK∗
1
(
xj1
)]
or respectively choose K[
xj1 > x
jS∗
1
(
xj1
)
and xj1 > x
jK∗
1
(
xj1
)]
independently of the decision of agent i. Hence, the
equilibrium is unique.
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Figure 3. Relevant critical value functions. (For µ = 1, σ = 2.)
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Figure 4. Inefficient switching decisions of agent i. (For µ = 1, σ = 2.)
because in this region agent j’s output is even worse (since ∂x
iS∗
1 (xj1)
∂xj1
≤ 1). Agent
i prefers to keep the old technology which has a lower mean, but also a smaller
variance after updating than a new technology would have. Since agent i has
already an output advantage over j, the probability of winning with a technology
with a below-average but safer output is higher than with a new, more variable
technology. In region B, on the other hand, agent i inefficiently chooses S, even
14
though output from the period 1 technology is above the expectation µ. This is
because in this region agent j’s output is even better (since ∂x
iK∗
1 (xj1)
∂xj1
≤ 1). Agent i
prefers to try a new technology which has a lower mean, but also a higher variance.
Since agent i is already lagging behind j in terms of output, the probability of
winning is higher if agent i takes a chance on a new technology which might be
more productive. Even though the agents are risk-neutral, the structure of the
tournament lets agent a act similar to a risk-averse agent in region A and to a
risk-loving agent in region B. However, even though the agents’ switching decisions
are not optimal from the perspective of the principal, the outcome is superior to
the case with no feedback where the agents always choose S. This would be sub-
optimal in the whole region where xj1 > µ
The next section will show that the principal can reduce this inefficiency by
assigning different weights on period 1 and 2.
3. Optimal Allocation
In this section the assumption that the prize goes to the agent with the higher ag-
gregate output is relaxed. Instead, the principal decides how to weigh the two peri-
ods when allocating the prize. In this setting the prize goes to the agent with the
higher weighted output: xi = r xi1 +(1− r) xi2 and the principal optimally sets the
weight r, with r [0, 1). Again, the agents decide between S and K in order to max-
imize the probability of winning which is Pr
(
r xi1 + (1− r) θi2 > r xj1 + (1− r) θj2
)
in this case. If the agents do not get any feedback the situation is as in section
2 and we can assume them to always choose S. If the principal gives feedback
and publicly reveals xa1, xb1 the agents choose between S and K to maximise the
probability of winning:
Pr
(
r xi1 + (1− r) θi2 > r xj1 + (1− r) θj2
∣∣∣xa1, xb1)
=F∆θ2
[
r
1− r ∆x1
]
=Φ
[ r
1−r∆x1 − µ∆θ2
σ∆θ2
]
,
15
r=
1
2
r=0 r=1
Figure 5. Inefficient switching decisions of agent i for different
weights. (For µ = 1, σ = 2.)
where ∆θ2 ∼ N (µ∆θ2 , σ∆θ2).
Analogously to section 2 there is a unique equilibrium where agent i prefers S if
xi1 ≤ xˆi1
(
xj1, r
)
and K otherwise, where the critical value xˆi1
(
xj1, r
)
is defined as:
xˆi1
(
xj1, r
)
=

xˆiS1
(
xj1
)
if xj1 ≤ µ
xˆiK1
(
xj1
)
if xj1 ≤ µ
and where:
xˆiS1
(
xj1
)
=
r
1−r x
j
1 + µ
(
2 +
√
2 + 21+σ2
)
r
1−r + 2 +
√
2 + 21+σ2
xˆiK1
(
xj1
)
=
xj1
[
r+σ2
1−r
]
+ µ
(
2 +
√
2 (2 + σ2)
)
r+σ2
1−r + 2 +
√
2 (2 + σ2)
.
The critical value xˆi1
(
xj1, r
)
can be seen in figure 5 for different weights r.
For r = 12
where both periods carry equal weight, we naturally have xˆi1 = xi∗1 , i.e. the critical
value is equal to the one derived in section 2.
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For r = 0
where only period 2 counts, we have xˆiS1 = µ. Thus, agents make the efficient
switching decision in the area where the competitor chooses S. If period 1 does not
affect the allocation there is no inefficient keeping, because the agents cannot gain
a head start. However, agents do not make the efficient switching decision in the
area where the competitor chooses K. Here the critical value becomes xˆiK1
(
xj1
)
=
σ2 xj1+µ
(
2+
√
2(2+σ2)
)
σ2+2+
√
2(2+σ2)
. The smaller the variance of the technology σ2, the closer to
efficiency the switching decision becomes, with lim
σ→0xˆ
iK
1 = µ. 8 On the other hand
inefficiency increases as σ grows, with lim
σ→∞xˆ
iK
1 = x
j
1. This is the most inefficient
behaviour, since the switching decision of agent i does not depend on their own
output xj1 at all any more, but only on the competitor’s output xj1. Thus, also when
all weight is on period 2, there is inefficient switching, though a little less than
in the case with equal weights. This is because, in the concerned area agent i’s
first period output xj1 is above expectation, but below the competitor’s output xj1.
Thus the updated expectation for second period output from the tested technology
for agent i will be lower. Thus, even though the competitor cannot gain a head
start in period 1, agent i prefers to take a chance on a new technology with higher
variance in order to have a higher chance to outdo the competitor’s technology.
For r → 1
where period 2 counts very little compared to period 1, we have lim
r→1xˆ
i
1 = x
j
1. The
agents follow the most inefficient rule, independently from the switching decision of
the competitor. Agent i always chooses S if her output is below the competitor’s,
even if it is above the expectation, because they can only win if they have a
huge 2nd period output. On the other hand, agent i always keeps if her output
is above the competitor’s, even if it is below the expectation, because it is very
unlikely that the competitor will catch up with them. However, if r = 1, i.e. when
the second period output is completely irrelevant for prize allocation, agents are
indifferent about switching, since the tournament is already decided after period
8However, for the extreme case of σ = 0 the problem is meaningless, since there is no uncertainty
about the technology, which has a fixed value of µ.
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1. Hence, they can be assumed to follow the principal’s wishes and switch when
xj1 ≤ µ. Therefore, the principal can achieve the efficient switching decision only
by making it irrelevant for the outcome of the tournament. However, this will
normally not be optimal.
In summary, the principal can indeed improve the switching behaviour of the
agents by increasing the weight on period 2. Alternatively, the optimal switching
behaviour can be achieved by putting all weight on period 1, such that the al-
location of the prize is completely independent from the behaviour of the agents.
Both alternatives might yet not be optimal in a more realistic setting where agents
exert effort, since the agents would not exert any more effort in period 2. This
will be explored in section 4.
4. Effort
This section considers the case where effort (ei2 ≥ 0) enters additively in the
output.9 First period output of agent i becomes xi1 = ei1 + θi1 + εi1 while second
period output is xi2 = ei2+θi2. The cost of effort is fixed to c (e) = e
2
2 . For quadratic
effort Ederer (2010) shows that the feedback policy does not affect the output level
in a setting without learning about technologies. However, it will be shown that
this is not the case when agents can switch technologies. As in section 3, the prize
goes to the agent with the higher weighted output: xi = r xi1 + (1− r) xi2, with
r [0, 1). The optimal effort and switching decision can be derived using backwards
induction. Agents exert higher effort after receiving feedback and - predictably
- they exert less effort in a period that has less weight for the allocation of the
prize. First, the case where the agents receive full feedback is considered.
4.1. Full Feedback.
4.1.1. Second Period Effort. After learning xi1, x
j
1 and choosing ai {S,K}, agent
i chooses effort ei2 to maximise expected utility EU i2, given by the probability of
winning minus the cost of effort.
9It would also be very interesting and perhaps more realistic to consider the case where effort
enters as a multiplier of productivity. However the problem becomes algebraically very complex
and it is not possible to get a general analytic solution.
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EU i2
(
ei2
)
= Pr
[
r
(
ei1 + θi1 + εi1
)
+ (1− r)
(
ei2 + θi2
)
> r
(
ej1 + θj1 + εj1
)
+ (1− r)
(
ej2 + θj2
) ∣∣∣xa1, xb1, ai ]− c (e)
=F∆θ2
[
r
1− r ∆x1 + e
i
2 − ej2
∣∣∣xi1, xj1, ai ]− (ei2)22
The first order condition (FOC) is:
eiF2 = f∆θ2
(
r
1− r ∆x1 + e
i
2 − ej2
∣∣∣xa1, xb1, ai)
Here, and in the remainder of the section, the analysis is restricted to cases
where the FOC is sufficient to determine the optimal effort.10 Then there is a
unique symmetric equilibrium where both agents exert the same effort
(
ei2 = e
j
2
)
,
since the FOC have the same value for both agents also when one is leading in
terms of first period output:
f∆θ2
[
r
1− r ∆x1 + e
i
2 − ej2
∣∣∣xa1, xb1, ai ] = f(−∆θ2) [ r1− r ∆x1 + ej2 − ei2
∣∣∣xa1, xb1, ai ] .
Because the distribution is symmetric, we have f∆θ2
(
z
∣∣∣xi1, xj1, ai) = f(−∆θ2) (−z ∣∣∣xi1, xj1, ai)
for all first period outputs and switching decisions. Hence, in equilibrium we have:
eiF2 = e
jF
2 = eF2 = f∆θ2
[
r
1− r
(
xi1 − xj1
) ∣∣∣xa1, xb1, ai ] (1)
Since lim
r→1
r
1−r
(
xi1 − xj1
)
=∞, we also have lim
r→1e
F
2 = 0 for all switching decisions.
Second period output eF2 goes to zero as r approaches 1. Clearly, the agents will
not exert any effort in period 2 if second period output does not count for the
prize.
4.1.2. Switching decisions. Before choosing second period effort ei2 and after learn-
ing the first period output xa1, xb1, agent i decides between S and K. The expected
payoff is:
10EU i2
(
ei2
)
is concave, however for small values of σ the effort level ei∗2 given by the FOC can
become larger than the resulting probability of winning. In that case, there would be no pure
strategy equilibrium. These cases are excluded from consideration here.
19
F∆θ2
[
r
1− r ∆x1
∣∣∣xa1, xb1 ]− c (eiF2 )
=F∆θ2
[
r
1− r ∆x1
∣∣∣xa1, xb1 ]− 12
{
f∆θ2
[
r
1− r ∆x1
∣∣∣xa1, xb1 ]}2
=Φ
[ r
1−r ∆x1 − µ∆θ2
σ∆θ2
]
− 12 φ
[ r
1−r ∆x1 − µ∆θ2
σ∆θ2
]2
where ∆θ2 ∼ N (µ∆θ2 , σ∆θ2). Setting g (z) = Φ (z)− 12 φ (z)2, we find that g (z)
is still monotonically increasing (as is Φ (z)), so the agent will make the choice
that gives a higher value of z, just as in the case without effort. Therefore the
agents have exactly same critical values for switching xˆi1
(
xj1, r
)
as in section 3.
4.1.3. First Period Effort. At the beginning of the tournament, agent i chooses
first period effort ei1 to maximise expected utility which takes the form:
EU i2
(
ei2
)
= Pr
[
r
(
ei1 + θi1 + εi1
)
+ (1− r)
(
ei2 + θi2
)
> r
(
ej1 + θj1 + εj1
)
+ (1− r)
(
ej2 + θj2
)]
− (e
i
1)
2
2 − E
(ei2)2
2

=Eθi2,θj2F(θj1+εj1−θi1−εi1)
[
ei1 − ej1 +
1− r
r
(
θi2 − θj2 + ei2 − ej2
)]
− (e
i
1)
2
2 − E
(ei2)2
2

The FOC is:
ei1 = Eθi2,θj2 f(θj1+εj1−θi1−εi1)
[
ei1 − ej1 + 1−rr
(
θi2 − θj2 + ei2 − ej2
)]
+Eθi2,θj2
({
f(θj1+εj1−θi1−εi1)
[
ei1 − ej1 + 1−rr
(
θi2 − θj2 + ei2 − ej2
)]
− ei2
}
∂ei2
ei1
)
−Eθi2,θj2
({
f(θj1+εj1−θi1−εi1)
[
ei1 − ej1 + 1−rr
(
θi2 − θj2 + ei2 − ej2
)]}
∂ej2(∆x1)
ei1
)
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As above, we restrict the analysis to cases where the FOC is sufficient to de-
termine the optimal effort. Then the equilibrium effort simplifies to:
eF1 = Eθi2,θj2 f(θj1+εj1−θi1−εi1)
[1− r
r
(
θi2 − θj2
)]
, (2)
Also first period effort is symmetric, due to the symmetry of f(θj1+εj1−θi1−εi1).
The second and third term can be shown to equal zero.11 Thus in equilib-
rium, first period effort does not have a strategic component affecting second
period output of either agent. We have
(
θj1 + εj1 − θi1 − εi1
)
∼ N (0, 2 + 2σ2). Since
lim
r→0
1−r
r
(
θi2 − θj2
)
= ∞, we also have lim
r→0e
iF
1 = 0, first period output eiF1 goes to
zero as r approaches zero. Clearly, the agents will not exert any effort in period 1
if first period output does not count for the prize.
4.2. No Feedback. Since the principal does not give feedback, the agents can-
not condition their switching decisions on first period output. As stated in the
basic model, both switching and keeping would give agents an equal probability
of winning. Thus, in the model without effort they are indifferent. The switch-
ing decision will, however, affect equilibrium effort. Specifically, if agent i keeps
the technology, aggregate productivity has a higher variance, independent of the
switching decision of the competitor. The value of f(θj1+θj2−θi1−θi2) (0), and therefore
the equilibrium level of effort, will be lower. This is because for a higher variance
of the aggregate output, the effort is expected to make less of a difference in the
probability of winning. Consequently, the agents prefer to keep the technology
since this will lead to lower effort and lower cost for her. So without feedback
agents keep their technology.
4.2.1. Second Period Effort. The symmetric equilibrium effort in the second period
will be:
11Proof analogous to the proof in appendix A.1 in Ederer (2010).
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eN2 =E∆x1
{
f(θj2−θi2)
[
r
1− r (∆x1)
]}
=
∞ˆ
−∞
f∆x1 (∆x1) fKK
[
r
1− r (∆x1)
]
d∆x1, (3)
where ∆x1 ∼ N (0, 2σ2 + 2), since first period effort will turn out to be sym-
metric.
4.2.2. First Period Effort. The symmetric equilibrium effort in the first period
has the same form as in the case with full feedback:
eN1 =Eθi2,θj2 f(θj1+εj1−θi1−εi1)
[1− r
r
(
θi2 − θj2
)]
=E∆θ2 f(θj1+εj1−θi1−εi1)
[1− r
r
(−∆θ2)
]
=
∞ˆ
−∞
fKK (∆θ2) f∆x1
[1− r
r
(∆θ2)
]
d∆θ2, (4)
since
(
θj1 + εj1 − θi1 − εi1
)
∼ N (0, 2σ2 + 2). Thus, for r = 12 , when period 1 and 2
carry the same weight, we have that effort in both periods is equal: eN1 = eN2 . This
is intuitive, given increasing marginal cost of effort and the absence of additional
information between the periods. This is not the case when different weights are
assigned to period 1 and 2. Clearly, for r > 12 , first period output will be higher
and for r < 12 second period output will be higher.
4.3. Comparison12. Second period effort with feedback eF2 as given by 1 will
vary depending on the values of xa1, xb1. The expectation of eF2 before the first
period is E∆x1
(
eF2
)
=
´∞
−∞ f∆x1 (∆x1) fθ2
[
r
1−r (∆x1)
]
d∆x1. The only difference
to the second period effort without feedback eN2 , as given by 3, is the distribution of
second period technologies fθ2 . This will be different from fKK since the agents will
not always switch, but base their switching decision on the feedback they receive.
The resulting distribution fθ2 will have a mean of zero, due to the symmetry of
12This part still needs to be revised. I’m working on a proof.
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the distributions, but it has a lower variance. Thus, the expected effort level with
feedback is higher than without in both periods.
5. Partial Feedback: Recommendations
While in the previous sections the principal was restricted to either giving full
public feedback or no feedback at all, this assumption is now relaxed such that
the principal can also give partial and private feedback. Specifically, the case
is considered where the principal privately sends a message m (S,K) to each
agent, recommending them S if xi1 ≤ µ and K if xi1 > µ. It will be shown, that
this policy is indeed incentive compatible. The agents prefer to follow the recom-
mendation, given the information conveyed and the efficient switching behaviour
is implemented.
5.1. Principal recommends S. If the principal privately recommends S to agent
i when xi1 ≤ µ, the ex post probability of winning is:
Pr
(
xi1 + θi2 > x
j
1 + θj2 |xi1 ≤ µ
)
= 1− Exj1,θj2,xi1
[
Fθi2
(
xj1 + θj2 − xi1 |xi1 ≤ µ
)
|xi1 ≤ µ
]
Proposition 1. If the principal privately recommends S to agent i if xi1 ≤ µ,
agent i prefers to follow the recommendation.
Agent i will follow recommendation of S if this gives a higher probability of
winning than K, given that xi1 ≤ µ. For this to be the case we need:
1− Exj1,θj2,xi1
[
FθiS
(
xj1 + θj2 − xi1
∣∣∣xi1 ≤ µ) ∣∣∣xi1 ≤ µ]
≥1− Exj1,θj2,xi1
[
FθiK
(
xj1 + θj2 − xi1
∣∣∣xi1 ≤ µ) ∣∣∣xi1 ≤ µ]
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⇒Exj1,θj2,xi1
[
FθiK
(
xj1 + θj2 − xi1
∣∣∣xi1 ≤ µ)
−FθiS
(
xj1 + θj2 − xi1
∣∣∣xi1 ≤ µ) ∣∣∣xi1 ≤ µ] ≥ 0
A sufficient (but not necessary) condition for this to hold is:
FθiK
(
z
∣∣∣xi1 ≤ µ)− FθiS (z ∣∣∣xi1 ≤ µ) ≥ 0 ∀z, (5)
i.e. FθiK (z |xi1 ≤ µ) first order stochastically dominates FθiS (z |xi1 ≤ µ). The proof
that 5 holds is in appendix A.2.
5.2. Principal recommends K.
Proposition 2. If the principal privately recommends K to agent i if xi1 > µ,
agent i prefers to follow the recommendation.
If the principal privately recommends K to agent i when xi1 > µ, the agent will
follow if K gives a higher probability of winning than S:
⇒Exj1,θj2,xi1
[
FθiS
(
xj1 + θj2 − xi1
∣∣∣xi1 ≤ µ)
−FθiK
(
xj1 + θj2 − xi1
∣∣∣xi1 ≤ µ) ∣∣∣xi1 ≤ µ] ≥ 0
A sufficient (but not necessary) condition for this to hold is:
FθiS
(
z
∣∣∣xi1 > µ)− FθiK (z ∣∣∣xi1 > µ) ≥ 0 ∀z (6)
i.e. FθiS (z |xi1 > µ) first order stochastically dominates FθiK (z |xi1 > µ). The proof
that 6 holds is in appendix A.3.
Since both propositions hold, the efficient switching decision can be implemented
with a private partial feedback scheme. If the principal privately recommends S
to agent i if xi1 ≤ µ and K if xi1 > µ, it is in the agents’ best interest to follow the
recommendation.
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5.3. The Case of n Agents with Partial Feedback. One might think that
recommendations as characterized above will not be able to implement the efficient
switching behaviour when the number of agents is increased. If the agents have to
face more and more competitors, it can be expected that whoever is the leader after
period 1 has an increasingly high output. So it might seem that always choosing
S in order to have a chance at catching the leader becomes more attractive - as in
the case inefficient switching in the setting with full feedback in order to catch a
far-ahead competitor. However it can be shown that this is actually not the case.
In a setting with an arbitrary number of competitors, each agent still wants to
follow the recommendation of the principal if the principal follows the same policy
as above, recommending S for xi1 ≤ µ and K for xi1 > µ.
In a setting with n agents, the probability of winning for agent i given message
m is:
Pr
(
xi1 + θi2 > xj |m
)
∀j 6= i
= Exj ,xi1
∏
j 6=i
[
1− Fθi2
(
xj − xi1 |m
)]
|m

If the principal privately recommends S to agent i when xi1 ≤ µ, the agent
follows if S gives a higher probability of winning than K:
Exj ,xi1
∏
j 6=i
[
1− FθiS
(
xj − xi1 |m
)]
|m

≥Exj ,xi1
∏
j 6=i
[
1− FθiK
(
xj − xi1 |m
)]
|m

⇒Exj ,xi1
∏
j 6=i
[
1− FθiS
(
xj − xi1 |m
)]
−∏
j 6=i
[
1− FθiK
(
xj − xi1 |m
)]
|m
 (7)
A sufficient condition for 7 to hold is still equation 5:
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FθK (z |x1 ≤ µ)− FθS (z |x1 ≤ µ) ≥ 0 ∀z.
The case for a recommendation of K when xi1 > µ is analogous. Therefore,
the agent wants to follow the recommendation of the principal in the case with n
competitors just as in the case with only 2. The difference in probability between
following the recommendation and deviating becomes smaller, since the probabil-
ity of winning in both cases decreases as the number of agents grows. However, the
relation between the probabilities is never reversed. Hence, it can be concluded
that agents follow the recommendation of the principal and the efficient switching
behaviour can be achieved, independently of number of competitors.
6. Conclusions
This paper has studied a tournament setting where agents require feedback to
learn about the productivity of their chosen technology. It has been shown that
full information revelation by the principal does not lead to an optimal technology
choice by the agents. Due to the tournament structure, the agents care about
winning instead of maximizing output. There is inefficient switching, where an
agent changes an above-average technology in order to have a better chance to
outdo the competitor. On the other hand, there is inefficient keeping, where
an agent holds on to a below-average technology if it is sufficient to beat the
competitor. Furthermore, it is found that this inefficiency can be ameliorated
when all weight is put on second period output for the allocation of the prize.
However, this will likely not be optimal in a setting when agents have to exert
effort. On the other hand, the efficient technology choice can be achieved if the
principal is able to give partial feedback in the form of recommendations. If the
principal does not reveal the output, but only recommends the agents to switch or
keep technology when it is efficient to do so, it is in the best interest of the agents
to follow the recommendation.
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Chapter 2. The Kindness of Strangers
1. Introduction
Last night, after donating the last of my change to Children In
Need (a UK telethon appeal), I got on the train from London to
Manchester. Feeling hungry, I went to the buffet car, only to find
that the card machine was broken and I couldn’t buy a sandwich.
I turned to walk back to my seat without anything to eat, but was
stopped by the man behind me who paid for the things I had tried
to purchase. It was a spontaneous act of kindness from a complete
stranger and left me with a great feeling. Thank you to all those
people out there who try in small ways to make the world a better
place! Anonymous post, 23/6/2012.13
Throughout modern history, thinkers of the most diverse backgrounds considered
kindness as one of the highest peaks touched by mankind. Jean-Jacques Rousseau
asked, “What wisdom can you find that is greater than kindness?” The Dalai
Lama said: “There is no need for temples, no need for complicated philosophies.
My brain and my heart are my temples; my philosophy is kindness.” William
Wordsworth wrote, “The best portion of a good man’s life is his little, nameless,
unremembered acts of kindness and of love.” Aldous Huxley maintained, “It is a
bit embarrassing to have been concerned with the human problem all one’s life
and find at the end that one has no more to offer by way of advice than ’try to be
a little kinder.”’
As shown in a UK survey conducted by Griffith et al. (2011), also ordinary
people care greatly about kindness: for many —as for the famous thinkers—,
it is the single most important contributor to their quality of life. Moreover, the
researchers document, experience of unkindness can exert an even greater influence
on people’s perception of social health than crime statistics.
13Retrieved the 30/7/2012 from http://www.helpothers.org/story.php?sid=31804. Numerous
stories of kindness are uploaded anonymously on a daily basis on many websites close in spirit to
helpothers.org, check for instance: randomactsofkindness.org, thekindnessofstrangers.net, and
politestranger.com.
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In the current paper, we propose a theoretical framework to study acts of kind-
ness, from and to strangers, along the lines of the story reported above. In the
following, we define an act of kindness as helpful behaviour towards people in need
which are not enforceable. We say that a society of strangers has the social norm
of kindness if its members perform, whenever in their power, acts of kindness.
We stylize the relevant situation where an act of kindness can arise as a dictator
game played among a pair of strangers randomly matched from some population.
Since —as Bardsley (2008) claims—, everyone faces dictator games all day, every
day, the stage game is repeated and at each round every person is randomly re-
matched in a new pair. The ’roles’ of the strangers (who the ’helper’ is and who
the ’receiver’ is) are randomly assigned at the beginning of each stage game. The
possibility of switching role across different stage games —in the story above: of
being sometimes without enough cash and sometimes with five extra pounds in
the wallet during different train journeys—, captures the idea that “life is like a
wheel.” This layer of risk about one’s future role in the dictator games to come
is precisely what drives our results: entirely selfish people can help today some
strangers in need in order to fuel the social norm of kindness, so as to increase the
likelihood of receiving some help, if needed, in the future.14 In other words, we
propose to interpret ’kindness from strangers’ as an indirectly reciprocal outcome15
driven by a selfish motive. In our model, as Sophocles would say —and Adam
Smith would reiterate—, “kindness is ever the begetter of kindness.”
This intuitive mechanism represents an attempt of formalization of the evid-
ences gathered by Griffith et al. (2011). The researchers document that people’s
understanding of kindness is in terms of how they would like to be treated: a man
from Wiltshire described it as “Treating people how you would like to be treated
yourself.” Those interviewed tend to stress the reciprocal character of kindness:
14We do not study the case of non-verifiable roles. Throughout the paper, an agent’s role is
publicly observable.
15Directly reciprocal outcomes arise when the same two agents interact repeatedly: A helps B and
then B helps A. Indirectly reciprocal outcomes arise when different agents interact repeatedly: A
helps B, B helps C, C helps D, and so on. For a broad discussion on reciprocity see, for instance,
Nowak & Sigmund (2005). For a recent survey on indirect reciprocity, see Sigmund (2012) and
the references therein.
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“We give out and we get back,” as a taxi driver puts it. Furthermore, the re-
searchers underline, the social norm of kindness requires to be constantly fed in
order to survive: “The old people do not respect us, so we wind them up. Why
not? They started it,” a teenage mother complains.
I was in Toronto a few weeks ago. As I was standing outside of a
Starbucks, I noticed a white BMW stop at the side of the road. The
driver stepped out, and at that moment noticed a homeless man
sleeping on the side walk. It was extremely cold that day. I was
freezing, and I had a sweater and a winter jacket on. The driver
of the BMW walked up to the homeless man who was sleeping, took
his jacket off, layed it on top of the man, and left. It definitely was
unexpected and so encouraging to see such kindness in action. The
driver didn’t even know I was watching. Anonymous post.16
The previous story shares with the first most of the main characteristics but it
differs, for our purposes, in an important one:17 the probability of role assignment
at the beginning of each round. In the first story, in fact, it seems plausible to
assume that the two strangers are ex-ante identical in their chances of finding
themselves without cash in their wallet or, conversely, in their chances to have an
extra five pounds —each time they travel by train. On the other hand, in the
second story, the BMW driver and the homeless man appear to face, systematic-
ally, very different chances of being in need of a jacket —each time there is a cold
night in Toronto. It appears that, across different cold nights, the BMW driver
will have a very high probability of being in the position of the ’helper’, while
the homeless person (unfortunately...) will have a very high chance of needing a
jacket in the role of the ’receiver’. The BMW driver and the homeless man are
16Retrieved the 30/7/2012 from http://www.randomactsofkindness.org/kindness-stories/516-
jacket-from-the-rich.
17The stage game is still a dictator game played among strangers randomly paired from some
population.
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heterogeneous in their probability of needing help and, to the other extreme, of
being actually able to give some help.18
We accommodate this idea of persistence of one’s role across different stage
games in two distinct ways. First, we allow for the possibility of having Markov
roles: a helper and a receiver today face different probability distributions over
tomorrow’s roles (e.g., if I have a jacket to give away today, I will —more likely—
have a jacket to give away also tomorrow). Second, we allow for the possibility that
different people have different permanent types: irrespectively of their role today,
different people face different probability distributions over tomorrow’s roles (e.g.,
because of different levels of —say— ability, some people are always more likely
to be in the role of the helper or in that of the receiver). We show that, within
this class of persistence, acts of kindness are more likely to arise in communities
characterized by Markov roles than by permanent types. Moreover, with respect
to the homogeneous case, both forms of heterogeneity make the social norm of
kindness harder to sustain at the society-wide level. This theoretical prediction
is in line with the empirical evidence: for instance, it has been shown that more
heterogeneous communities are characterized by a lower level of social activities
(Alesina & La Ferrara, 2000), by a lower level of social trust (Alesina & La Ferrara,
2002), and by a lower provision of public goods (Miguel & Gugerty, 2005). On the
other hand, even though stark heterogeneity might impede kindness from thriving
at the society-wide level, we pursue the possibility of sustaining it within more
homogeneous subgroups of the whole society. This is a well known issue in the
social sciences.
Although relatively recent in economics, ’group formation and indirect reci-
procity’ is a very old and central topic in anthropology and sociology: as Kolm
(2001) puts it, rephrasing Gouldner (1960), indirect reciprocity is the “basic glue
18We do not want to rule out the possibility that even well off people can find themselves
in the position of needing some help and, on the other hand, that people in difficult situ-
ations could still be able to help others. Indeed, on the web it is plentiful of stories of
this sort. See, for instance: http://www.randomactsofkindness.org/kindness-stories/512-what-
is-twenty-dollars, the story of a homeless woman helping out another homeless person; or
http://www.helpothers.org/story.php?sid=30619, the story of a homeless woman purchasing a
coffee for a wealthy person. (Both stories were retrieved the 30/7/2012.)
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that makes people constitute groups or societies.” In the same spirit, Mauss (1924)
calls reciprocity “one of the human rocks on which societies are built.”
Within this body of literature, most of the early economic studies try to as-
sess the groups’ ability of sharing idiosyncratic risks (i.e., illness, unemployment,
poor agricultural performance, etc.) —through indirect reciprocity— among their
members.19 A common finding is that risk-pooling groups appear to be too small
in size in order to guarantee full insurance to the participants: typically, these
groups are smaller than the efficient society-wide network.20 This evidence has
motivated further empirical and experimental research: why and how do people
form risk-sharing subgroups of the entire society?21 Arcand & Fafchamps (2012)
document, in an empirical study in Burkina Faso and Senegal, positive assortat-
ive matching on the base of land ownership, education, age and ties with society
authorities.22
Taking these empirical facts into consideration, we extend our basic framework
to highlight two main channels which can prevent the social norm of kindness
from spreading at the society-wide level and confine it to smaller groups: limited
information about the actual level of kindness in society (which gives rise to free-
riding) and, as already mentioned, role’s persistence in the form of permanent
types.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 1.1 clarifies why we consider
self-interested agents rather than assuming altruistic or reciprocal preferences and
section 1.2 gives and overview of the related literature. Section 2 introduces the
baseline model with perfect monitoring and homogeneous agents. The assumption
of perfect monitoring is relaxed in section 3 where we allow for the possibility of
19See, for example: Townsend (1994), Udry (1994), Jalan & Ravallion (1999), Gertler & Gruber
(2002), Murgai et al. (2002), and Fafchamps & Lund (2003).
20As long as individuals are risk-averse, shocks are at least partly idiosyncratic and the forma-
tion/maintenance of groups is costless, then efficient risk-sharing requires that the risk-pooling
group be as large as the economy itself. See, for instance, Fafchamps (2008).
21See, for instance: Fafchamps & Gubert (2007), Abramitzky (2008), Barr & Genicot (2008),
Fafchamps (2008), Angelucci et al. (2009), Ligon & Schechter (2011), Arcand & Fafchamps
(2012), and Attanasio et al. (2012).
22Similar people, along each dimension, tend to group together. As an example, assume in the
society there are two groups. Consider the case of education. Then, the results suggest that in
one group we should observe most of the better educated people and in the other most of those
with a lower level of education.
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free riding. An agent can refuse to act kindly and go undetected, as long as there
remains a sufficient number of agents acting kindly. Chapter 3 considers a different
variation of the basic model. Here we introduce persistent differences in risk and
the consequences for the sustainability of kindness. In section 1 we consider the
case of Markov roles, where agents have an increased likelihood to keep their role
from one period to the next. on the other hand, in section 2 we study the case
of permanent types, where agents have different probabilities to be a helper or
receiver in every period. We find that a society-wide norm of kindness might not
be feasible with heterogeneous agents. Consequently, we examine the feasibility
and welfare properties of kindness in sub-coalitions. Section 3 concludes both
chapter 2 and 3.
1.1. Why Selfishness? The fact that we depict instances of kindness such as
those in the stories reported above as indirectly reciprocal outcomes (as opposed
to directly reciprocal) follows from restricting our attention to kindness from and
to strangers. On the other hand, the fact that we represent our players as purely
selfish requires some motivation.
In the economic literature, the gift-giving behaviour of people has been mo-
tivated by, at the very least, three main classes of preferences: altruistic, selfish,
and reciprocal.23 Broadly speaking, a person has altruistic preferences if she cares
both about her own payoff and about the payoffs of others.24 On the other end
of the spectrum, an individual has selfish preferences if she only cares about her
own payoff. Differently, a person displays reciprocal preferences if she cares both
about her own payoff and about the behaviour of other people: in our context, an
individual might want to reward those who were seen to help others in the past
23For finer classifications of the motives that could possibly drive the gift-giving behaviour of
people, see, for instance: impure altruism and warm glow in Andreoni (1989) and in Andreoni
(1990); altruism and spitefulness in Levine (1998); kindness (as a motive and not as an out-
come) and confusion in Andreoni (1995), fairness and inequity aversion in Fehr & Schmidt
(1999) and in Bolton & Ockenfels (2000); mimicking in Fowler & Christakis (2010); risk-sharing
and consumption-smoothing in Kimball (1988), in Coate & Ravallion (1993), and, for a compre-
hensive survey, in Fafchamps (2008). For a recent discussion on cooperation from an evolutionary
perspective, see Nowak (2012) and the references therein.
24This same definition sometimes goes, in the economic literature, under the label of social
preferences. See, for example: Charness & Rabin (2002).
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and to punish those who did not.25 Given our focus on kindness within pairs of
strangers, who —by assumption— do not know anything about the personal past
behaviour of the partner, the reciprocal motive is excluded a priori.26
It is common in laboratory experiments to observe approximately 50% of the
subjects in one-shot dictator games to give away some of their money to anonym-
ous receivers (Camerer, 2003). Because the game is not repeated, this finding is
at odds with the predicted behaviour of selfish agents.27 As Hammond (1975)
puts it, it seems evident that altruism is a sufficient condition for any charitable
behaviour we may observe, but —more interestingly—, is it also necessary?
Somehow ignoring Hammond’s cautionary question, up until the last fifteen
years, these high rates of giving were taken as evidence of the fact that most people
are altruistic. In the last fifteen years, experimental economists have investigated
more systematically why so many subjects decide to give in one-shot dictator
games. The evidences gathered so far greatly deflate the altruistic motive: some
people seem to be truly altruistic, but many more appear to be acting strategically
for some expected personal return rather than to make their peers better off. Selten
& Ockenfels (1998) is one of the first experiments where the altruistic motive is
explicitly challenged, the authors favour a risk-sharing kind of story. Cherry et
al. (2002) find that when people have the opportunity to give away earned wealth
(as opposed to windfall wealth), the rate of giving decreases from 80% to 21%.
In addition, when people are also given the chance to free-ride, the giving rate
falls further to 3%. Dana et al. (2007) confirm that adding the possibility of
free-riding approximately halved the giving rate. List (2007) and Bardsley (2008)
show that by enlarging people’s action set to taking money (on top of giving)
nearly all giving vanishes. Ligon & Schechter (2011) show that many people, in
a field experiment with windfall money, are observed to give gifts out of altruism
25For discussions on reciprocal preferences/motives see, for example: Rabin (1993), Nowak &
Sigmund (1998), Charness & Rabin (2002), and Dufwenberg & Kirchsteiger (2004).
26As explained in greater detail in the literature review, we distinguish between reciprocal out-
comes and reciprocal preferences/motives. In principle, reciprocal preferences are a sufficient
but not a necessary condition for reciprocal outcomes. As a consequence, by excluding a priori
the reciprocal motive, we are not ruling out the possibility of obtaining reciprocal outcomes.
27For a discussion see, for example: List (2007) and Bardsley (2008).
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but that, in a more realistic environment (with earned money), that evidence
disappears. We interpret these results as suggestive of the fact that there exist
conspicuous shares of gift givers who are not, in our terms, genuinely altruistic
or, more precisely, whose altruistic motive —compared to the selfish— is not a
particularly robust/consistent. Still, the aforementioned evidence only partially
addresses Hammond’s question: it confirms that in one-shot dictator games we
should not observe such high rates of giving, but it does not show that selfish
people would indeed engage in charitable behaviour. To do that, we turn to
experiments in repeated dictator games.
Seinen & Schram (2006) is the first paper which experimentally investigates the
environment we model: a repeated dictator game with, at the beginning of each
round, random matching in pairs from a large population and random assignment
of roles (helper and receiver) within each pair. In a treatment group, people know
the history of play of the agent with whom they are matched (public histories);
in another treatment group —as in our framework— this information is not given
(private histories), i.e., the two paired players are strangers. The researchers find
evidences of indirectly reciprocal outcomes among strangers: the giving rate is
18%. Also, people do react to external incentives: when histories are public, the
helping rate grows to 74%. Englemann & Fishbacher (2009) perform a comple-
mentary experiment in which the aim is to further investigate the result on the
public histories treatment: are people helping more out of reciprocity or out of
selfishness?28 For this end they include the possibility that only half of the agents
in the population have public histories. The experimenters find confirming evid-
ences of indirectly reciprocal outcomes among strangers: the giving rate is 32%.
Furthermore, they obtain that 80% of subjects react to strategic incentives: they
document an increase of 5 points in the helping rate due to reciprocity and of 35
28In this context, the authors define a selfish person as someone who helps in order to positively
affect her own history of play with the aim of increasing her likelihood to be helped, if needed,
in the future (i.e., strategic reputation-building). This irrespectively of the history of play of the
receiver with whom they are paired.
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points due to selfishness. Charness & Genicot (2009), in a context of directly recip-
rocal outcomes,29 find evidences that favour the selfish over the altruistic motive:
people exchange gifts in order to smooth consumption when facing uncertainty,
relationships which are expected to last longer give rise to higher rates of giving,
as do higher degrees of risk aversion. Leider et al. (2009), in a large field ex-
periment conducted at Harvard dormitories, document the relevance of indirectly
reciprocal outcomes among strangers and that, similarly to Charness & Genicot
(2009), the expectation of a longer/more intense relationship positively affects the
present rate of giving.
In the last years, economists have started investigating how gift-giving behaviour
is affected by social networks. Specifically, there has been a growing interest
in testing the intuitive hypothesis that altruism towards a person gets stronger
the tighter the relationship with this person (directed altruism). Hoffman et al.
(1996) suggest that a decrease in perceived social distance increases the giving
rate in dictator games. Leider et al. (2009) find that, when helpers are paired
with receivers who are close friends (as opposed to strangers), their gift-giving
rate motivated by altruism increases by 52%. Ligon & Schechter (2011) find
qualitatively similar results. Directed altruism is also proposed by Fafchamps &
Lund (2003) as an interpretation for their empirical findings. Along the same lines
are the results from the field experiment conducted by Attanasio et al. (2012).
Moreover, Fafchamps (2008) collects empirical evidences that depict altruism as
being limited to relationships between close relatives.
Returning to Hammond’s question, we read the experimental evidences gathered
so far as an indication that altruism is, even though a sufficient, not a necessary
condition for charitable behaviour. On the one hand, many people show to have,
at some level, altruistic preferences; but on the other, many of these seem to
respond readily to incentives that affect their own payoffs in ways that imply a
stronger and more stable selfish motive (over the altruistic). In addition, the fact
29The same pair of agents play repeatedly a dictator game with random assignment of roles at
the beginning of each round.
35
that altruism seems to be directed further diminishes its appeal in our specific
context: a population of strangers.
1.2. Related Literature. The current article is related to different streams of
economic literature. In what follows, we briefly review each of them and highlight
the main differences with respect to what we do.30
The single article that inspired our baseline model the most is Hammond (1975).
There, he proposes a repeated dictator game (called “poverty game”) in which
directly reciprocal outcomes (i.e., only two agents) between selfish agents can
be sustained in equilibrium due to the fact that agents switch roles (i.e., helper
and receiver) at each round. In our baseline model, we extend Hammond’s idea
to indirectly reciprocal outcomes (i.e., more than two agents) and generalize the
role switching from deterministic (i.e., each round agents switch roles for sure)
to stochastic, with and without persistence (i.e., each round agents have some
probability of switching roles).31
A first relevant literature is that on ’random matching games’, started by
Rosenthal (1979) and Rosenthal & Landau (1979). Kandori (1992) and Okuno-
Fujiwara & Postlewaite (1995) greatly enrich the initial findings and, importantly,
extend the Folk Theorem for this class of games. Kandori (1992) draws attention to
a key relationship between information and cooperation: if information circulation
is somehow limited within society, then the larger the size of society, the harder it
gets to sustain cooperation. Ellison (1994) further develops upon this point. Since
then, a constantly growing body of research has been investigating the issue: what
are the institutions that can help the survival of cooperation in large communities
with little or no information circulation about agents’ past behaviour? One of
the first efforts in this direction is Gosh & Ray (1996). The authors show that if
pairs are not re-matched each round at random (i.e., agents are free to build up
long-lasting relationships) and there is some heterogeneity in the population, then
30As in our framework, a common assumption shared by all the papers cited in this section
is that contracts are not enforceable. As a consequence, only self-enforcing outcomes can be
sustained in equilibrium: this requires that at any point in time, the benefit from complying
with an agreement must outweigh the gain from reneging.
31We study Hammond’s role switching as a special case of the model with Markov roles.
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cooperation can be sustained in large communities of strangers. Watson (1999) is
another notable example of cooperation sustained by a mix of reputation-building
and heterogeneity. More recently, Athey et al. (2010) propose various mechanisms
where cooperation is achieved through reputation-building alone (i.e., no agents’
heterogeneity): group-specific investments and social hierarchies. The model al-
lows agents to choose, prior to the random matching phase, the group within which
the stage game will be played. In other words, the whole society is divided into
groups and agents choose, each round, which group to attend. As a consequence,
—on the one hand— the authors can exploit agents’ group choice histories (i.e.,
agents’ ’seniority’ in each group) to engender within-group loyalty and construct
cooperative equilibria. On the other, they can address the issue of endogenous
group formation. This latter line of research, about informal society division (e.g.,
castes, tribes, clans, etc.), is further explored —for instance— by Choy (2013).
The author extends the framework proposed by Gosh & Ray (1996)32 adding two
dimensions: first, society is partitioned into groups and second, agents can ob-
serve if their partners have ever interacted with members of other groups. Then,
he shows that the social norm prohibiting agents from forming relationships with
members of different groups (i.e., group segregation) can be welfare improving and
thus, able to persist.
The main theme of our paper is different from that of the random matching
literature, even though —from a modelling perspective— the commonalities are
twofold. Our main interest does not lie in studying the minimal information trans-
mission mechanisms necessary to sustain efficient outcomes by society enforce-
ment. Rather, we investigate how risk about agents’ future roles or positions in
society shapes their current attitude towards cooperation. On the other hand, our
models do share common features with those in the random matching literature.
First, in an extension of our baseline model, we limit the circulation of informa-
tion about past levels of kindness in society —à la Green & Porter (1984)—33 and
32Consequently, cooperation is obtained —as in the original model— through a mix of
reputation-building and agents’ heterogeneity.
33The influential model proposed by Green & Porter (1984) can be summarized, for our purposes,
as follows. A group of firms produce a homogeneous product and compete on quantities. The
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operationalise, in our somehow different framework,34 the basic idea suggested by
Kandori (1992): the survival of the social norm of kindness in large communit-
ies can be endangered by free riding. Second, we suggest an alternative trade-off
(with respect to Kandori’s): between heterogeneity and cooperation. The more
heterogeneous is society, the harder it gets to sustain cooperation. In studying
this relationship, we assume perfect circulation of information; consequently, we
do not implement any reputation-building mechanism in order to sustain cooper-
ation.35 Even though society-wide cooperation might not be possible because of
stark heterogeneity, less diverse subgroups of agents could still cooperate.
A second relevant literature is that on ’informal risk-sharing’ started by Kimball
(1988) and Coate & Ravallion (1993). These models depict small communities in
which agents are subject to volatile streams of non-storable income and, in order
to obtain some degree of insurance, agents organize a ’common pot’ of money: in
each period, all those with ’high’ income deposit money in the ’pot’, while those
with ’low’ income collect money from the ’pot’. In these communities agents are
homogeneous, information circulation is perfect, and income-sharing agreements
are not enforceable (hence informal). Because of the lack of commitment, informal
contracts regulating the functioning of the ’common pot’ must be self-enforcing.
oligopolists sell their product at a common price which is a function both of the quantities
injected in the market by all the competitors and of an independent stochastic element (i.e.,
some price shock determined independently of firms’ behaviours). Firms observe the aggregate
price but not its individual components. As a consequence, when the product’s price is ’low’, the
oligopolists do not know with certainty if that is a consequence of someone selling ’a lot’ (i.e.,
above the Cournot level) or, conversely, of some price shock. In this environment, in order to
sustain a profitable collusion in equilibrium, the authors construct a grim-trigger strategy where
firms have to infer from the observed price and their knowledge of the stochastic element’s
distribution how plausible it is that no one is ’misbehaving’ by producing more than their due
quantity. Our free riding extension is inspired by this mechanism.
34Most of the models in the random matching literature, in the post-Kandori (1992) era, employ
a prisoner’s dilemma as a stage game. Conversely, we use a dictator game with random role
assignment.
35Rohner (2011) proposes a model of social tensions in which a similar channel is at work: social
disputes are particularly likely to arise in populations that are more ethnically heterogeneous.
Furthermore, the author shows —in his different framework— a result close in flavour to one of
ours: when the dividing line in society is class rather than ethnicity, where contrary to the latter
the former is not ’immutable’, fewer social tensions are predicted. Parallely, in our model with ex-
ante heterogeneity: permanent types jeopardize society-wide kindness more than Markov roles.
Rohner’s (2011) model differs from ours in many respects, one above the others: cooperation
hinges on reputation-building.
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The possible definitions of ’self-enforcement’ and the corresponding degrees of in-
surance they give rise36 represent the object of this literature. The early papers,
such as Coate & Ravallion (1993), Kocherlakota (1996), Kletzer & Wright (2000),
and Ligon et al. (2002), focus on concepts of self-enforcement which are mainly
ex-post stable: they consider as relevant only individual deviations from society-
wide cooperation, ignoring the possibility that subgroups of the entire society could
break the informal society-wide agreement and decide to create their own common
pot. Stemming from this observation, Genicot & Ray (2003) tighten the definition
of self-enforcing contract by adding a requirement of ex-ante stability: a common
pot can be created among a group of agents only if there is no subgroup which
would unilaterally profit from creating its own, smaller, common pot. Bold (2009)
builds upon the framework of Genicot & Ray (2003) and fully characterizes the
set of coalition-proof informal agreements. Bloch et al. (2007) propose a comple-
mentary solution concept with respect to the existing ones, that of fragility: they
allow for deviations to occur in some states and then pose bounds on the probabil-
ity that a deviation is observed. Another example of endogenous group formation
within this class of models is Weynants (2011). The most recent evolution in the
informal risk-sharing literature is represented by Bloch et al. (2008) and Ambrus
et al. (2010). The researchers move away from the notion of insurance-group
toward that of insurance-network. They do so because recent empirical evidence
suggests that a significant segment of (informal) insurance transactions is bilateral
(i.e., directly reciprocal outcomes).37
Our paper is conceptually related to the informal risk-sharing literature. This
is so because of the viewpoint on kindness we propose: a non-enforceable and
indirectly reciprocal outcome sustained by the selfish motive of intertemporal
consumption-smoothing. There is one main difference between our baseline model
36From perfect-sharing, in which everyone contributes to the common pot with everything, to
autarky, in which each agent is left with her own income.
37In our case, because agents are randomly re-matched in each period, we believe that the notion
of group is more appropriate then that of network.
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and that employed in this literature: the random matching element.38 In the
informal risk-sharing model, within each period, agents endowed with ’surplus’
money can transfer it to anyone with a ’deficit’ anywhere within society, cost-
lessly.39 Thus, the possibility of helping is not pair-specific.40 Differently, in our
framework this is not the case: acts of kindness are assumed to be non-transferable
and, consequently, pair-specific. An agent in need can only be helped by the
agent she bumps into if the latter actually is in the position to give some help,
irrespectively of the fact that there could be many other potential helpers around
the corner. Conversely, a potential helper can only exert an act of kindness if she
bumps into an agent in need, no matter how many agents in need could be waiting
elsewhere in society.41 42
A third relevant literature is that on ’enforced reciprocity’.43 Two notable ex-
amples are Karlan et al. (2009) and Leider et al. (2009). These articles represent
a mired attempt to conceptually and empirically disentangle the reciprocal prefer-
ences/motives from the reciprocal outcomes. Referring, in general, to ’reciprocity’
38To be precise, Bloch et al. (2007) do have random matching in their model. On the other
hand, the aim of their paper is very distant from ours: they propose —in very general terms—
a new stability concept, that of fragility.
39The same is not true across time periods because income is assumed to be non-storable.
Similarly, in our framework “There’s no use doing a kindness if you do it a day too late” (to
express the idea with the words of Charles Kingsley).
40Notice that, here, we are abstracting from the incentives of the agent who is endowed with the
extra income to be willing to share her sums with the rest of society. Our argument is a priori
with respect to any consideration of willingness, it has merely to do with the action set available
to the members of society: independently of her fondness, an agent with ’high’ income could
always (and costlessly in this model) contribute with part of her endowment to the common
pot. Equivalently, any ’low’ income agent could always (and costlessly) collect money from the
common pot.
41Again, this is a priori with respect to any incentive-related consideration.
42Clearly, ours is a subjective modelling choice. We decide to concentrate on unplanned and
spontaneous acts of kindness between pairs of strangers. Nothing prevents agents from organizing
something similar to a ’common pot’ also in the context of acts of kindness. We actually observe
many of these initiatives in the form of charitable organizations. For instance, a group of people
could systematically collect coats from wealthier individuals and, during the coldest nights,
purposedly go around the city and distribute them to homeless people in need. Whenever an
act of kindness is somehow planned, intermediated, and stimulated by a third party (say, by a
charitable organization), then the economic circumstances within which a potential helper must
decide her action rapidly increase in complexity with respect to our stylized framework (see, for
example: social pressure in Della Vigna et al. (2012) and framing in Grossman & Eckel, 2012).
In this case, we believe that —from a modeling perspective at least—, the informal risk-sharing
framework is closer to the target and the interested reader is forwarded to the aforementioned
literature.
43Additional discussions on reciprocity (with related references) can be found both in the intro-
duction and in the section “Why selfishness?”
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can be a source of ambiguity. We could be talking either about reciprocal out-
comes or about reciprocal motives. These are two very different objects. For
instance, in our context: reciprocal outcomes are the observable acts of kindness
among the members of a group, while reciprocal motives are the unobservable
preferences that could —potentially but not necessarily— motivate the reciprocal
outcomes. Karlan et al. (2009) propose a tractable model where reciprocal out-
comes can be obtained without requiring agents to have reciprocal preferences.
Leider et al. (2009) find that the model fits their experimental data better than
alternative preference-based theories of reciprocity. Even though both the papers
are quite distant from ours, we still believe to share with them some perspective:
we interpret acts of kindness as indirectly reciprocal outcomes obtained through
selfish motives.44
2. Basic Model
In the current section we lay out the baseline model: a formalization of the first
story reported in the introduction. Three main assumptions underline the baseline
model: perfectly anonymous information, absence of persistence in agents’ roles,
and population homogeneity. After studying the baseline model, we will relax the
assumptions one by one in the following sections of the article.
2.1. Description of the Game. Within a society of strangers,45 dictator games
are played for infinitely many periods. Agents are randomly matched in pairs at
the beginning of each period. Every agent, in each period, can be of two possible
roles: a helper (H) or a receiver (R). At the beginning of each period, Nature al-
locates a role to every agent in society following the objective distribution (known
to the agents): Pr (R) = p and Pr (H) = 1 − p. This probability distribution is
exogenously given (i.e., agents cannot do anything to affect the likelihood of hav-
ing a specific role) and independent of agents’ previous roles (no persistent roles).
44For an in-depth discussion on “Why selfishness?” (as opposed to altruism or to reciprocity,
for example), see section 1.1.
45For the time being, a precise specification of society is not essential. We could either have, for
instance, a continuum of agents or a finite number of them. In the later extensions of the basic
framework, whenever required, we will be more precise.
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Note that p can also be interpreted as the expected proportion of receivers in so-
ciety, and thus the expected likelihood to be matched with a receiver. Each agent
observes both her own and her partner’s role realization. The combination of roles
in a pairing determines the agents’ action sets and payoff functions. Define any
(H,R) or (R,H) match as a relevant match. Only in relevant matches is a dictator
game played.
(1) Relevant Match: (H,R) or (R,H)
• H can either play kind (K) or not kind (NK). R has an empty action
set.
• If H plays K, then H incurs the cost c and R receives the benefit b,
where b, c > 0.
• If H plays NK, then both players get a payoff of zero.
(2) Other Matches: (H,H) or (R,R)
• No game is played, both players have an empty action set.
• Both players get a payoff of zero.
Without loss of generality, c is normalized to 1. The agents know if all helpers in
relevant matches have played K in all past periods or if someone has ever played
NK. However, this information is not personal, agents do not know how a specific
player behaved in the past. Moreover, they do not keep any record of the identity
of the people with whom they played dictator games in the past. In other words,
whenever two agents meet more than once, they will not recognize each other and
think they are in the presence of a stranger (perfectly anonymous information).
2.2. Equilibrium. Notice that if the game were not repeated (so the agents only
played once), then the unique Nash Equilibrium (NE) would be for the helper in a
relevant match to play NK. Also, if the game were infinitely repeated and Nature
moved only at the beginning of the first period (so if each agent kept the same
role along the whole game), then the unique Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium
(SPNE) would be for a helper to play NK every time she is in a relevant match.
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Differently, in the game with Nature moving at the beginning of each period co-
operative outcomes can be sustainable in equilibrium.46 Specifically, the following
strategy can be an SPNE of the game:
If you are the helper in a relevant match, play K unless at least one
helper in a relevant match played NK in the past. Otherwise, if at
least one helper in a relevant match played NK in the past, play
NK.
We define the cooperative equilibrium outcome as the social norm of kindness.47
Note that, if all agents follow the proposed strategy, a deviation by a single agent
leads to the breakdown of the social norm of kindness forever. Thus, this amounts
to a collective grim trigger strategy. The only agents who have the possibility
to deviate are, in any given period, helpers matched with receivers. Given that
everyone else has played K so far, deviation (NK) is not profitable for a helper in
a relevant match if:
−1 +
∞∑
t=1
δt [p · (1− p) · b− (1− p) · p] ≥ 0,
where δ ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor common to all agents. Hence, the cost of
being kind needs to be smaller than the expected future payoff from sustaining
the social norm of kindness. This can be rewritten as:
b ≥ 1 + 1− δ
δ · p · (1− p) = b
Base (δ, p) . (8)
46At the same time, the repetition of the stage equilibrium, where agents always play NK, is
always an equilibrium of the repeated game. In fact, there can be many equilibria, where agents
play NK some of the time. However, we do not consider the issue of equilibrium selection here
and focus on the fully cooperative equilibrium.
47Notice that we are not referring to any specific strategy in the current definition. Any equilib-
rium strategy which gives rise, on the equilibrium path, to the cooperative outcome is consistent
with the social norm of kindness.
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bBase gives the minimum value of b which is necessary to sustain kindness. Notice
that bBase is decreasing in δ and as p approaching 0, 5. In other words, b can be
lower if agents are more patient and if the likelihood of becoming a receiver is
neither too low nor too high. Indeed, if an agent is patient, she is more willing
to be kind today in the expectation of receiving kindness in the future. Also, in
order for a helper to be willing to exercise kindness today, she must believe that
in the future both the possibility of being in need of kindness is concrete and that,
in this case, there is a sufficient likelihood of meeting a helper.48
3. Imperfect Monitoring
In this section, we relax the assumption of perfect monitoring maintained in
the basic model. Differently from the baseline model, agents do not know if every
helper in a relevant match actually played K in the previous period. They observe
the aggregate number of K played in the previous period but do not know what the
number of relevant matches was. A practical example for this could be that there
is information about the aggregate amount of charitable donations in a given year
and agents make inferences about the level of charity in their community. There
will be an equilibrium where the social norm of kindness can be sustained, as long
as the number of acts of kindness stays above a critical threshold. When the level
of kindness falls below the threshold cooperation breaks down. When considering
whether to cooperate and behave kindly as a helper in a relevant match, an agent
considers how likely it is that she is pivotal for the sustainment of the norm. Only
if a failure to be kind leads to the breakdown of the kindness equilibrium, does
the agent feel a negative consequence of her deviation. With respect to the basic
48In the attempt of keeping the algebra as simple as possible while preserving the economic
message of the model, we derive the condition for existence of a cooperative SPNE only for the
grim trigger strategy. This gives us the lowest threshold for b. If b > bBase, additional cooperative
equilibria with a finite number of punishment periods exist. However, on the equilibrium path
of the models with perfect anonymous information, there will be no deviation and thus no need
for punishment. Thus, different punishment lengths are observationally equivalent and imply
the same level of welfare. Welfare is only affected in the free riding extension, where cooperation
can break down on the equilibrium path.
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model, this introduces the possibility of free riding and, consequently, a new trade-
off. We can interpret the social norm of kindness analogous to a public good. The
incentive to play K comes from the requirement to reach the threshold to sustain
the social norm for the future when the agent could be in need of kindness herself.
A free rider would be helper in a relevant match who plays NK without causing
the social norm of kindness to break down (i.e., someone who does not contribute
to the public good when asked, but who still benefit from it when in need).49 It
will be shown that this kind of imperfect monitoring can lead to a limit on the
size of the population where social norm of kindness can be sustained. As the size
of society gets larger, it becomes harder to sustain the norm, since it is less likely
that an agent is pivotal (CLAIM 2 below). On the other hand, it is precisely when
society size grows that the social norm of kindness becomes —potentially— more
gainful (CLAIM 5 below).
3.1. Description of the Game. There is a society of 2 ·N agents divided into
two independent groups of equal size, N . At the beginning of each period, each of
the N agents in one group is randomly matched with another agent from the other
group, so there are N matches per period. As in the basic model, each agent is
allocated a role [either helper (H) or receiver (R)] at the beginning of each period,
withPr (R) = p and Pr (H) = 1−p. For each agent, this probability is exogenously
given and independent of her previous period’s role (no persistent roles). As in the
baseline model, the case when helper and a receiver meet is defined as a relevant
match. Dictator games are played only in relevant matches. The probability that
a given match is relevant is q = 2 · p · (1− p). Then the number of relevant
matches out of N in a given time period is distributed according to a binomial
distribution with sample size N and success probability q. Define the number acts
of kindness (number of agents playing K) in a given time period as KN . If all
helpers in a relevant match cooperate, KN obviously has the same distribution as
49An alternative possibility to introduce imperfect monitoring would be that a failure to be kind
would be observed and become known with a certain probability. Also in this case it would make
sense that detection becomes less likely as group size increases. Thus our setting is only one
of many possibilities to capture these issues. The information structure bears a resemblance to
Green and Porter (1984), where companies infer from price changes how likely it is that another
company has deviated from a cartel.
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the number of relevant matches: KN ∼ Binomial (q,N) with E [KN ] = N · q and
Var [KN ] = N · q · (1− q). The PMF of KN is given by fN and the CDF as FN .
The action sets and the payoff functions are the same as in the basic game.
Agents can make inference from the realization of the random variableKN about
the attitude towards kindness of society as a whole. They know the probability
distribution of the number of relevant matches and observe their own role as well
as the role of the agent they meet in each period. However, they do not observe
the realized number of relevant matches in each period. Furthermore, agents
observe the number of K’s that were played in the previous period, K —which is
a realization of the random variable KN . We think it is realistic to assume that
agents receive some signal about the overall ’level’ of kindness in society beyond
their narrow personal experience, and that this affects their own attitude towards
kindness.
We assume that agents do not carry over time the memory of their personal
histories of play: the only information helpers in relevant matches process while
deciding how to play is last period’s realization of KN . This assumption is a
simplification that - if anything - will make kindness harder to sustain. Agents
with memory could only face a further incentive to play K, therefore the absence
of memory is both analytically convenient and enables us to isolate the free riding
incentive from confounding elements.50
3.2. Equilibrium. We consider SPNE of the following form: All agents have the
same critical number number of acts of kindness k? and follow the strategy:
50Consider e.g. a strategy where agents seize cooperation both after K falls below the crit-
ical level as well as after personally experiencing defection in one of their personal interactions.
Given that everybody else seizes cooperation after the critical level has been reached, it is always
subgame perfect to do so as well. If agents also stop cooperation after personally experiencing
defection, this would constitute an additional channel through which defection can lead to neg-
ative consequences for the perpetrator. However, - as shown by Kandori (1992) - it might not be
subgame perfect to stop cooperation after personally experiencing defection for some parameter
values. In this case cooperation only breaks down if K falls below the critical value and the
incentives are exactly the same as in the setting without memory. Therefore, memory would
only make it easier to sustain cooperation.
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If you are the helper in a relevant match, play K if minimum was
exceeded (k ≥ k?) in the previous period. Otherwise (k < k? in the
previous period) play NK.
Thus the game can be in two possible phases. In the cooperative phase the social
norm of kindness is intact. The minimum level of kindness k? has been reached
in all past periods and thus all helpers exercise kindness when matched with a re-
ceiver. In the uncooperative phase the social norm of kindness has broken down.
In one previous period the minimum level of kindness k? has been missed, so no
one exercises kindness any more. Clearly, the suggested strategy is subgame per-
fect in the uncooperative phase. Next, we check for which parameters it also holds
for the cooperative phase. For conciseness, define:
θ = p · (1− p) · (b− 1) ,
where θ gives the expected per-period-payoff in the cooperative phase. Further,
define the ex-ante probability of continuing the cooperative phase for one more
period, provided that all agents follow the equilibrium strategy:
α = Pr (KN ≥ k?) = 1− FN (k? − 1) .
Then the continuation value for of playing K for a helper in a relevant match
is:
VK = −1 + β ·
∞∑
t=1
(
δt · α(t−1) · θ
)
.
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The agent has to pay a cost of 1 and has and expected payoff of β·
∞∑
t=1
(
δt · α(t−1) · θ
)
from continuing the cooperative phase in future periods. Here, β stands for the
probability of continuing the cooperative phase to the next period, given that the
concerned agent plays K and provided that all other agents follow the equilibrium
strategy. Then, β is given by:
β = Pr (KN−1 ≥ k? − 1) = 1− FN−1 (k? − 2) ,
where FN−1 is the CDF of Binomial (q,N − 1). This is because, if the respective
agent plays K, there only have to be a minimum of k? − 1 acts of kindness in the
remaining N − 1 matches in order to reach the critical value k?. After the next
period, the probability of continuing the cooperative phase from one period to the
next is given by α.
On the other hand, if the agent defects and plays NK, the continuation value is:
VNK = 0 + γ ·
∞∑
t=1
(
δt · α(t−1)N · θ
)
.
In contrast to VK , the agent does not pay the cost of kindness and the probabil-
ity of continuing the cooperative phase to the next period is now given by γ. This
probability will be lower, given that the agent now plays NK. γ is then given by:
γ = Pr (KN−1 ≥ k?) = 1− FN−1 (k? − 1) ,
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This is because, if the respective agent does not play K, there now have to be a
minimum of k? acts of kindness in the remaining N − 1 matches in order to reach
the critical value k?. After the next period, the probability of continuing the co-
operative phase from one period to the next is again given by α. Thus, there will
only be a punishment for defection if this leads to a breakdown of cooperation.
Note that the difference in continuation probabilities is:
β − γ = FN−1 (k? − 1)− FN−1 (k? − 2) = fN−1 (k? − 1) ,
which is just Pr (KN−1 = k? − 1), the probability that there are exactly k? − 1
acts of kindness in the remaining N − 1 matches. If this is the case, then the
agent is pivotal. The cooperative phase continues only if she plays K and breaks
down if she plays NK. Only in this case there will be a negative consequence for
the deviator.
Hence, in the cooperative phase, a deviation (NK) is not profitable for a helper in
a relevant match if:
b ≥ 1 + 1− δ · α
δ · q2 · (β − γ)
= 1 + 1− δ · [1− FN (k
? − 1)]
δ · q2 · fN−1 (k? − 1)
= 1 + 1− δ · [1− FN (k
? − 1)]
δ · k?2·N · fN (k?)
= bFree (δ,N, q, k?) .
(9)
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Equation 9 gives the critical value bFree (δ,N, q, k?).51 If the benefit of kindness b
exceeds this value, then the proposed strategy is a SPNE of the game. Note that
bFree depends on the selected minimum value k?. There can be various possible
values of k? which can support an equilibrium for a given level of b. The selection
of the optimal minimum value k? is the topic of section 4. In the remaining part
of this section we study the behaviour of bFree with respect to changes in the val-
ues of the parameters. Proofs for the following claims are reported in Appendix B.
Claim 1. As δ → 0, bFree (δ,N, q, k?)→ +∞.
Not surprisingly, as agents get more impatient, it becomes less attractive to
incur the cost of kindness in order to sustain the social norm of kindness for a
potential benefit in the future. Thus a higher benefit b is necessary to sustain the
equilibrium.
Claim 2. As N → +∞, bFree (δ,N, q, k?)→ +∞.
When society size increases, the probability of being pivotal for the continuation
of the social norm of kindness, fN−1 (k? − 1), gets smaller and a higher benefit b is
necessary to sustain the equilibrium. The social norm of kindness can be sustained
more easily in smaller communities.
Claim 3.
∂bFree (δ,N, q, k?)
∂q
< 0.
Notice that the maximum value of q is 0.5, when p = 0, 5. Thus, as the probab-
ility of having the role of a receiver and being in need of kindness moves towards
0.5, the social norm of kindness can be sustained more easily. The intuition is the
same as that in the basic model: If p is too small, the likelihood of being in need
51The third inequality follows from
(
N − 1
k? − 1
)
= k
?
N
(
N
k?
)
, given the pdf of the binomial
distribution fN (k) =
(
N
k
)
qk (1− q)n−k.
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of kindness in the future is small. If p is too large, the likelihood of meeting a
helper when in need is small. In both cases, the preservation of the social norm
of kindness is not very valuable.
4. Welfare
As noted before, if the benefit level b is sufficiently high, it can support an
equilibrium with various possible values of k?, the critical value of acts of kindness
for which the norm is sustained. We define the set K as the set of critical values
k? for which the proposed strategy is a SPNE. The purpose of this section is
to determine the optimal value k?, which maximises expected welfare. As in the
basic model, also here any equilibrium strategy compatible with the social norm of
kindness is strictly preferred to the non-cooperative equilibrium from an expected
payoff viewpoint. But, differently from the basic model, it is possible for the the
social norm of kindness to break down on the equilibrium path, i.e. without any
deviation. This is so because the game has an infinite horizon and Pr (KN < k?) >
0 for k? > 0. Even if everyone is following the proposed strategy, it is possible
that the number of relevant matches is below k? and thus the minimum number of
acts of kindness is not met. In this case, the social norm of kindness breaks down
not because of the misbehaviour of some agents but simply because the realized
number of relevant matches is ’too low’ given the values of q and N .
Notice how, in statistical terms, Pr (KN < k?) given KN ∼ Binomial (q,N)
could be interpreted as the probability of type I error in a test procedure.52 In
fact, the proposed strategy works as if every agent, after having collected the data
k, performed a statistical test to evaluate the maintained hypothesis that the social
norm of kindness holds in the society, H0 : KN ∼ Binomial (q,N), whose rejec-
tion region is {k ∈ [0, N ]| k < k?}. It follows that the probability of type I error is:
Pr (KN < k?|H0) = FN (k? − 1) .
52The type I error in a test procedure happens when the statistician rejects her maintained
hypothesis even though it is correct.
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Given this interpretation, we can define FN (k? − 1) as the probability of involun-
tary breakdown of the social norm of kindness.
Whenever the social norm of kindness breaks down, each agent gets a stream of
’zeros’ thereafter. The occurrence of this eventuality with positive probability in
equilibrium (i.e., typically k? = 0 does not sustain the social norm of kindness) is
the ’price’ that has to be paid in order to constrain free riding attitudes in society.
Consequently, it becomes apparent how the choice of k? plays an active role also
in terms of welfare.
The ex-ante expected payoff of any agent is:
V = α · (θ + δ · V )
= α · θ1− α · δ
.
It follows that the optimal minimum value k? is given by:
k? = arg max
k?∈K
{
[1− FN (k? − 1)] · θ
1− δ · [1− FN (k? − 1)]
}
, (10)
where the set K collects all the values of k? for which an equilibrium can be sus-
tained, as b ≥ bFree (δ,N, q, k?), from 9.
Claim 4. Assume K is non-empty. Then the unique solution of 10 is the smallest
k? ∈ K.
Because V is strictly increasing in α = 1− FN (k? − 1), the probability to con-
tinue the social norm of kindness, conditional on the proposed strategy being an
equilibrium (i.e., a non-empty K), the lowest possible k? is the optimal minimum
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value. Clearly, the smallest minimum value k? is the one for which the probab-
ility of an involuntary breakdown of the social norm of kindness, FN (k? − 1), is
minimal.
Claim 5. For any given k?, as N rises, V increases (given that b is sufficiently large
to support the equilibrium).
For any k?, as the size of society gets larger, the expected welfare increases.
This is so because, for given k?, the probability of involuntary breakdown of the
social norm of kindness, FN (k? − 1), decreases in N and, as underlined above, V
is strictly increasing in α = 1−FN (k? − 1). Clearly, when a larger group of agents
play the proposed game, the likelihood of an insufficient number of good matches
to realise decreases.
On the other hand, as seen in CLAIM 2, a larger N makes the proposed strategy
harder to be sustained as an equilibrium. This is because bFree (δ,N, q, k?) in-
creases in N , so that a higher benefit b is necessary to ensure the existence of the
cooperative equilibrium and to discourage free riding. As N grows large, the num-
ber of elements in the set K decreases, and if the lower bound k∗ rises, then the
overall effect on V is ambiguous. Therefore, an increasing N leads to a trade-off
between existence and efficiency.
Finally, it should be remarked that welfare could be enhanced by reducing the
length of the uncooperative phase. For simplicity, we have restricted the analysis to
a grim trigger strategy, where the social norm of kindness breaks down indefinitely
after the number of acts of kindness has fallen short of the minimum level k?. As
this is possible even on the equilibrium path, expected welfare is reduced. For a
given k? and a sufficiently high benefit b > bFree (δ,N, q, k?), the uncooperative
phase could be shortened to a finite number of periods T . However, in this setting
there would be a trade-off between the minimum level of k?and the minimum
number of T . This is because b sets a lower bound on both k? and T . If k? is
small it is less likely that the social norm of kindness breaks down in the first place
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while a small T reduces the social cost of breakdown. The jointly optimal choice
of T and k? is beyond the scope of this paper.
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Part 3. Kindness with Persistent Risk
In this chapter we introduce persistence: some agents are more likely than
others to be in the position of a helper. First, we consider the case where roles
are persistent: with respect to a receiver, an agent who has the role of a helper in
one period is more likely to also be a helper in the following period. We call these
Markov roles. Notice that, in this case, agents are still homogeneous before the
first assignment of roles. In contrast, we then examine persistence in the sense of
permanent types. Agents permanently have different likelihoods of being helpers
or receivers. Some agents are always more likely to have the role of a helper than
others, as in the example of the BMW driver from the introduction. Here, agents
are ex-ante heterogeneous. Hence, we first relax the assumption of absence of
persistence in agents’ roles (Markov roles) and then the assumption of population
homogeneity (permanent types).
We show that, for a given expected proportion of receivers in society (i.e., p),
introducing persistence increases the critical value for b that is necessary to sustain
kindness relative to the basic model
(
bMarkov, bTypes ≥ bBase
)
. This is because both
forms of persistence imply a higher probability of becoming a helper for some
agents, relative to the expected probability in society. It is relatively more difficult
to convince these agents to be kind, hence they are critical for the computation of
the thresholds for b. Furthermore, the minimum value for b is higher in the case of
permanent types than in the case of Markov roles
(
bTypes ≥ bMarkov
)
. In the case
of permanent types, some agents always have a higher probability to become a
helper, while, in the case of Markov roles, the probabilities reverse with a change
of roles.
In the present chapter we will assume a continuum of agents for mathematical
convenience, in contrast to chapter 2 where a finite population size was necessary
to sustain cooperation in the presence of free-riding.
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1. Markov Roles
1.1. Description of the Game. In this section we relax the assumption that
the distribution of future roles is independent of the realization of current roles.
The idea is to allow for situations in which being a helper (receiver) in one period
implies a different chance of remaining a helper (receiver) in the next period. The
structure of the game in the baseline model is maintained with the only differ-
ence that now the probability distribution of roles is represented by the following
transition matrix:
Ht+1 Rt+1
Ht 1− pH pH
Rt 1− pR pR
where pH , pR ∈ (0, 1). We restrict the analysis to the case of a stationary system,
where the expected proportion of receivers in the society is constant at p. Con-
sequently, given pH , we assume pR = (1− pH) · p(1−p) . The basic model studied
previously can be obtained as the special case where pH = pR = p.
First, we consider a situation where an agent who is a helper in in period t has a
lower chance of finding himself in the role of a receiver in period t+1 compared to
an agent who already is a receiver in period t: pH ≤ pR, hence roles are persistent.
We then compare this case with Hammond’s setting of switching roles (Hammond,
1975),53 where pH = 1, pR = 0 and p = 12 . In contrast to the case of persistent
roles, in Hammond’s model agents switch roles with certainty in every period,
hence we have the opposite of persistence.
1.2. Equilibrium. In a setting with a continuum of agents who can be identified,
a possible strategy to support kindness would be:
If you are the helper in a relevant match, play K unless the receiver
has played NK in a relevant match in the past. In this case play
NK.
53See literature review for further details on Hammond’s model.
56
In what follows we find conditions for the existence of this cooperative equilib-
rium. The persistent case does not introduce any strategic novelty with respect
to the basic model since a deviator will still receive no further kindness, the only
difference being the distribution of types. As a consequence, the existence of a
cooperative equilibrium (identical to that proposed in the section about the ba-
sic model) is guaranteed by a condition similar to (8), where the differences are
uniquely due to the more flexible probability distribution of roles assumed here.54
Define VHR as the expected discounted payoff for a helper matched with a re-
ceiver if she adheres to the proposed strategy. Define similarly VHH , VRR and VRH .
These can be expressed as:
VHR = −1 + δ · {(1− pH) · [p · VHR + (1− p) · VHH ] + pH · [p · VRR + (1− p) · VRH ]}
VHH = VHR + 1
VRR = δ · {(1− pR) · [p · VHR + (1− p) · VHH ] + pR · [p · VRR + (1− p) · VRH ]}
VRH = VRR + b
.
As in the basic model, the only agents who have the possibility to deviate are
helpers matched with receivers in a given period. Given that everyone else has
played K so far, a deviation (NK) is not profitable for a helper in a relevant match,
if VHR ≥ 0. This can be rewritten as:
b ≥ 1 + 1− δ
δ · p · (1− p) ·
p− δ · (1− p) · (p− pH)
pH
= bMarkov (δ, p, pH) . (11)
54As in the basic model, following the same reasoning, we only consider the collective grim
trigger strategy.
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bMarkov is the minimum value of b necessary to sustain the social norm of kindness
with Markov types. It can be easily seen that bMarkov > bBase for pH < p. Thus,
this form of persistence makes it ’harder’ to sustain the social norm of kindness.
This makes intuitive sense, as from the perspective of a helper in a given period,
it is now less likely to become a receiver in any future period.
1.3. Hammond’s Switching Roles. In Hammond’s model we have the opposite
of persistence, since agents switch roles for certain in each period. In our notation
pH = 1, pR = 0, and p = 12 . After a calculation analogous to the case above, we
obtain the critical value (before substituting for p = 12):
bSwitch (δ, p) = 1 + 1− δ
δ · p · (1− p) ·
[
p+ δ · (1− p)2
]
. (12)
It can be easily seen that bSwitch
(
δ, 12
)
< bBase (δ, p), for any p 6= 0 and δ <
1.55 Specifically, for p = 12 we have: b
Switch
(
δ, 12
)
=
(4
δ
− 3
)
·
(
1
2 +
δ
4
)
and
bBase
(
δ, 12
)
= 4
δ
− 3. Thus, the social norm of kindness is ’easier’ to sustain with
switching roles. This, again, makes intuitive sense since any helper knows that
she will be a receiver for sure in the following period, and indeed half of the times
she is going to play the game.
2. Permanent Types
In this section, we examine a different form of persistence. Here, the likelihood of
being helpers or receivers does not depend on the role that was assigned in the last
period. Instead, we assume that agents have permanently different likelihoods of
being helpers or receivers. Thus, the agents have ex-ante heterogeneous permanent
types.
55Since
[
p+ δ · (1− p)2
]
< 1.
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2.1. Society-wide Kindness. An agent’s type, denoted by the subscript i, is
characterized by her likelihood pi to be a receiver in any given period. In what
follows, we refer to this as her personal risk level. The average risk level of an
agent in this society is denoted by p56 which is assumed to be common knowledge.
Consequently, p can also be interpreted as the expected proportion of receivers in
society, and thus as the expected likelihood to be matched with a receiver.
General cooperation (all helpers matched with receivers play K unless they have
deviated before) can be maintained if expected payoff from cooperation is positive
for all agents. This is the case if the following conditions hold:
b ≥ 1 + 1− δ · [1− (p− pi)]
δ · pi · (1− p) = b
Types
All (δ, p, pi) , ∀i .
The necessary value for b decreases in the personal risk level pi. Low-risk agents
(i.e., agents with a ’small’ pi) need a higher benefit to cost ratio in order to be
willing to cooperate than high-risk agents (i.e., agents with a ’large’ pi). This is
so because they are relatively less likely to become receivers, and thus to benefit
from the social norm of kindness. Hence, the binding constraint on b is for the
agent with the lowest risk level in society:
b ≥ 1 + 1− δ · [1− (p− pmin)]
δ · pmin · (1− p) = b
Types
All (δ, p, pmin) . (13)
For any mean preserving spread from a homogeneous society with pi = p,∀i to
a heterogeneous society with pmin < p, we have that bTypesAll > bBase. Hence, the
required benefit to sustain a general social norm of kindness is higher in a het-
erogeneous society. This difference is increasing in the degree of heterogeneity as
56In order to allow for comparison to the baseline model, it is assumed that the heterogeneous
society is obtained through a mean preserving spread from the the baseline model.
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given by (p− pmin). Moreover, the critical value bTypesAll is unambiguously increas-
ing in p. Indeed, with a higher average level of risk in society, a given agent is both
relatively less likely to meet a helper when in the role of a receiver, and relatively
more likely to meet a receiver when in the role of a helper. Thus, they are more
likely to incur a cost than to benefit from the social norm of kindness.
2.2. Two groups. Here we consider the case in which agents can have only two
types: a share a ∈ [0, 1] of society has a high-risk of becoming R, ph, while the
remaining share (1− a) has a low-risk of becoming R, pl, where pl ≤ ph. As before
we assume this to be a mean preserving spread from the basic case with homo-
geneous risk p, such that: p = a · ph + (1− a) · pl. Here, society-wide kindness is
beneficial for high-risk agents if:
b ≥ 1 + 1− δ · [1− (p− ph)]
δ · ph · (1− p) = b
h
All (δ, p, ph) , (14)
and for low-risk agents if:
b ≥ 1 + 1− δ · [1− (p− pl)]
δ · pl · (1− p) = b
l
All (δ, p, pl) . (15)
As stated above, the condition on b which is the hardest to fulfil is for the agent
with the lowest risk level in society: blAll > bhAll for pl < ph. So, blAll is the relevant
critical value for the feasibility of society-wide cooperation.
Claim 6. bBase (δ, p) < blAll
(
δ, p, p
)
, for any p, δ, a ∈ (0, 1) and pl < p.57
A lower benefit b is always required to make kindness feasible in a homogeneous
group with a risk of p than in a heterogeneous society formed through a mean
57We obtain bTypes,iAll = bBase, as a special case, when pl = ph = p.
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preserving spread. Hence heterogeneity makes it harder to sustain the social norm
of kindness throughout society.
We can also compare this case of permanent types with the case of Markov roles.
Claim 7. bMarkov
(
δ, p, p
)
< blAll
(
δ, p, p
)
, for any p, δ, a ∈ (0, 1) and p < p.
A sensible comparison is obtained by setting pH = pl = p. This means that,
with Markov roles, the reduced probability of a helper to turn into a receiver in the
next period (i.e., pH) is equal, with permanent types, to the reduced probability
to be in the position of a receiver for the low-risk types (i.e., pl). Also, to allow
for comparison, we consider an average probability to meet a receiver of p. In this
case, we have:
bMarkov = 1+ 1− δ
δ · p · (1− p) ·
p− δ · (1− p) ·
(
p− p
)
p
< blAll = 1+
1− δ ·
[
1−
(
p− p
)]
δ · p · (1− p) .
Hence, it is easier to sustain the social norm of kindness with Markov roles than
with permanent types and average risk p. The intuition for this is that in the case
of permanent types, some agents always have a higher probability to become a
helper, while, in the case of Markov roles, the probabilities reverse with a change
of roles. Thus, from the perspective of an agent with type pl —the critical agent
in the permanent types case—, the probability of being a receiver in any future
period is lower than for a helper in the Markov case. But then, the probability
of becoming a receiver in the future is the likelihood of —potentially— benefiting
from the social norm of kindness. Thus, an agent with a permanently lower risk
will be harder to win for cooperation than a helper in the Markov case. Putting
this together with the findings from the last section we arrive at the following
ranking of critical values for the benefits:
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bSwitch
(
δ, 12
)
< bBase (δ, p) < bMarkov
(
δ, p, p
)
< blAll
(
δ, p, p
)
, for any
p, δ, a ∈ (0, 1) and p < p.
This ranking is quite intuitive and results from the different degrees of persistence
in the different settings. The less persistence, the easier it is to make kindness
sustainable. The lowest benefit bSwitch
(
δ, 12
)
is necessary to sustain kindness in
Hammond’s switching case, where agents switch every period with certainty. The
second lowest benefit, bBase (δ, p), is necessary to sustain kindness in a group with a
constant, homogeneous risk. The next higher benefit, bMarkov
(
δ, p, p
)
, is necessary
in the Markov case where agents who have the role of receiver in one period are
more likely to have this role also in the next period than agents who have the role
of helper. Finally, the highest benefit, blAll
(
δ, p, p
)
, is necessary in the case with
permanent types, where some agents are always more likely than others to be in
the role of receivers.
2.3. Within-Group Kindness. Even if the social norm of kindness cannot be
sustained at the society-wide level, it may still be feasible to sustain it among
subgroups of agents with the same personal risk level. The grim-trigger strategy
to sustain the social norm of kindness only among agents with the same risk level
pi (i.e., within the high-risk or low-risk group, respectively) is:
Play K if you are a helper and matched with a receiver from your
group and if no one from your group has defected in the past.
When meeting a member of the other group or after a defection in
your group, play NK.
For this strategy of exclusive cooperation within groups to work, we assume that
agents can observe the risk level of the agent they are matched with and of any
potential deviator.58 If we maintain the assumption that all agents are matched
58It could also be an equilibrium for high-risk agents to play K with everyone and for low-risk
agents to always play NK. High-risk agents would follow the rule: “Play K if you are a helper
and in a relevant match unless another high-risk agent has defected. In that case, play NK
forever.” Meanwhile, the low-risk agents never cooperate. However, for this strategy to be
implemented, high-risk agents would still need to observe the risk-level of a deviator in order to
decide whether to stop cooperating or not. Given that types need to be observable in either case,
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with equal probability (i.e. irrespective of their types), the probability of being
matched with an agent from one’s own group is equal to the size of the group as a
share of society. If there is cooperation only within one’s own group, the members
of the group do not receive or exercise kindness when matched with a member of
the other group and their payoff is zero in that case. Given this rule, the only
agents who have the possibility to deviate are helpers matched with receivers from
their group in a given period. In order for the strategy to be an SPNE, their ex-
pected payoff from playing K must be positive. Thus, within-group kindness is an
equilibrium for the high-risk agents, if:
b ≥ 1 + 1− δ
a · δ · ph · (1− ph) = b
h
Group (δ, a, ph) , (16)
while for low-risk agents, within-group cooperation is an equilibrium if:
b ≥ 1 + 1− δ(1− a) · δ · pl · (1− pl) = b
l
Group (δ, a, ph) . (17)
Claim 8. bBase (δ, p) < bhGroup (δ, a, ph) , blGroup (δ, a, ph), for any p, δ, a ∈ (0, 1) and
pl < p < ph.
A lower benefit b is always required to make kindness feasible in a homogeneous
group with a risk of p than to support in-group kindness in either the high or
low-risk subgroup of a heterogeneous society formed through a mean preserving
spread with a · ph + (1− a) · pl = p. Hence, heterogeneity makes kindness always
harder to sustain, be it society-wide as in CLAIM 6, or within groups as here.
Both bhGroup and blGroup decrease in the share of society of the respective type: a
and (1− a). This is so because the greater their share, the more likely it is that
then the proposed strategy of exclusive within-group cooperation, where every agent cooperates
but only with those of the same risk level, is welfare dominant.
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they are matched with a member of their group and benefit from the social norm
of kindness.
Claim 9. blAll ≤ blGroup for any pl, ph, δ, a ∈ (0, 1), pl < ph and δ ≤
1− ph
1− p− (1− a) · pl · (ph − pl) .
The relationship between blAll and blGroup is ambiguous. It might require either a
lower or a higher value of b to sustain society-wide kindness for low-risk agents.
Specifically, society-wide kindness is easier to sustain than in-group kindness if
agents are relatively impatient, i.e., δ is low enough. This is because a more pa-
tient agent is more willing to wait until they meet another agent from their group,
while a less patient agent is more willing to include higher risk agents and increase
the scope of cooperation. The critical value for δ decreases in (ph − pl), i.e., society
wide kindness is easier to achieve if the risk levels are not to different. Moreover,
the critical value for δ is increasing in a, i.e., society wide kindness is harder to
achieve if the share of high-risk agents is large.
Claim 10. blGroup ≤ bhGroup for any δ ∈ (0, 1) and (1− a)·pl·(1− pl) ≥ a·ph·(1− ph).
Furthermore, also the ranking of blGroup and bhGroup depends on the parameters. In-
group cooperation requires a lower benefit if the type makes up a larger share of the
group and for an in-group risk level pi close to 12 . Together, CLAIMS 9 and 10 allow
to determine the ordering of blAll,blGroup and bhGroup, in order to determine whether
either society-wide kindness or in-group kindness either for low-risk or high-risk
agents requires a lower benefit. Depending on the parameters, any ordering is
possible.
2.4. Welfare. This section explores the welfare ordering of society-wide and in-
group cooperation. Specifically, the aggregate expected per-period welfare will be
compared for the different settings. For a homogeneous group this would be:
WBase = p · (1− p) · (b− 1) .
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As before, we compare this to a heterogeneous group with two types that form a
mean preserving spread from the homogeneous society. For the case of
society-wide kindness, ex-ante expected welfare for the high type is:
W hAll = ph · (1− p) · b− p · (1− ph)
and for the low type:
W lAll = pl · (1− p) · b− p · (1− pl) .
Clearly we have W lAll < W hAll for pl < p < ph, since in any given period low types
are more likely to pay than high types and high types are more likely to receive
than low types.
Claim 11. a ·W hAll + (1− a) ·W lAll = WBase for any pl, ph ∈ (0, 1) and a · ph +
(1− a) · pl = p.
It can easily be checked that the aggregate welfare from society-wide kindness
in a heterogeneous society is exactly the same as the welfare from kindness in the
corresponding homogeneous society. Hence, even though a higher benefit is neces-
sary to make a kind equilibrium feasible in a heterogeneous society (see CLAIM 6),
if it is feasible the resulting aggregate welfare is the same as in the homogeneous
society. However, the welfare gain from kindness is unevenly distributed, since
high-risk agents benefit more than low-risk agents.
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Next, we look at ex-ante expected welfare for in-group kindness.
For the high type this is:
W hGroup = a · ph · (1− ph) · (b− 1)
and for the low type:
W lGroup = (1− a) · pl · (1− pl) · (b− 1) .
Claim 12. a·W hGroup+(1− a)·W lGroup < a·W hAll+(1− a)·W lAll for any pl, ph ∈ (0, 1)
and a · ph + (1− a) · pl = p.
Comparing the expressions shows that aggregate welfare from in-group kindness
is lower than society-wide kindness. Hence, if society-wide kindness is feasible, it
is preferred from an aggregate perspective.
Claim 13. W lGroup < W lAll for ph · (1− pl) < b · pl · (1− ph).
The low types prefer society-wide to in-group cooperation if the expected gain
from extending cooperation to a high type is larger than the expected cost. This is
the case when the likelihood of having to pay a high type is smaller than likelihood
of receiving from a high type times the value of the benefit b. If this is not the
case, low agents would prefer in-group kindness, even though society-wide kindness
might be feasible and would lead to higher aggregate welfare.
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3. Conclusion
Chapter 2 shows that the social norm of kindness can arise as an equilibrium
of an infinitely repeated dictator game played between randomly matched agents.
Neither altruism nor direct reciprocity are necessary to motivate kindness in this
setting. Instead, the incentive comes from an uncertainty about one’s future po-
sition, as agents can find themselves on any side of the dictator game: a receiver
in need of kindness or a helper able to show kindness to others. The helper acts
kindly, even at a cost, in order to uphold the social norm of kindness which might
benefit her in the future when she finds herself in need of kindness. The kindness
equilibrium is easiest to sustain when the probability of taking on either role is
close to 12 .
The social norm is also possible to sustain with imperfect monitoring. In a
stylized setting where agents cannot observe every single interaction, but only
an aggregate level of kindness, they can use this information to infer the level of
compliance in society. There is an equilibrium where agents seize to act kindly
if aggregate kindness has fallen short of a specified critical level. The agents act
kindly in order to avoid being pivotal for the breakdown of the social norm. This
equilibrium becomes harder to sustain as the society grows large. On the other
hand, the potential welfare from kindness increases with the size of society.
Chapter 3 shows that the social norm of kindness also becomes harder to sustain
when there is persistence in the risk. This is the case for Markov roles, where agents
have a higher likelihood of of being in need of kindness in one period if they were
in the same position in the previous period. Hence, there is persistence in risk
from one period to the next. It becomes even harder if persistence is permanent.
In a heterogeneous society where some agents permanently have a higher risk of
being receivers than others it might not be possible to sustain a social norm of
kindness for the society as a whole. For a sufficiently heterogeneous society, this
can lead to a fragmentation of society where kindness is only feasible within more
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homogeneous subgroups. Kindness is easiest to achieve in large subgroups with
a risk level close to 12 . Alternatively, kindness might not be sustainable at all in
heterogeneous societies.
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Appendix A. Appendix for Chapter 1
A.1. Derivation of Remark 1.
f
(
θi1
∣∣∣xi1) = fxi1,θi1 (xi1, θi1)fxi1 (xi1) =
fxi1 (x
i
1 |θi1 ) fθi1 (θi1)
fxi1 (x
i
1)
=
fε (xi1 − θi1) fθi1 (θi1)
fxi1 (x
i
1)
=
1√
2pi exp
(
−(x
i
1−θi1)2
2
)
∗ 1√2piσ2 exp
(
−(θ
i
1−µ)2
2σ2
)
1√
2pi(1+σ2)
exp
(
−(xi1−µ)
2
2(1+σ2)
) = 1√
2pi σ21+σ2
exp
−
(
θi1 − µ+σ
2xi1
1+σ2
)2
2 σ21+σ2

⇒
(
θi1
∣∣∣xi1) ∼ N
(
µ+ σ2xi1
1 + σ2 ,
σ2
1 + σ2
)
A.2. Proof of proposition 1. In the following the superscript i will be sup-
pressed. In order to show that equation 5
FθK (z |x1 ≤ µ)− FθS (z |x1 ≤ µ) ≥ 0 ∀z,
holds, both terms are rewritten:
FθS (z |x1 > µ) = FθiS (z) =
zˆ
−∞
fθ1 (t) dt
.
fθK (z |x1 ≤ µ) =
fθK (z) · Pr (x1 ≤ µ |z )
Pr (x1 ≤ µ)
= fθK (z) · Fε (µ− z)
Fx1 (µ)
= 2 fθ1 (z) Fε (µ− z) ,
⇒ FθK
(
z
∣∣∣xi1 ≤ µ) =
zˆ
−∞
2 fθ1 (t) Fε (µ− t) dt.
Substituting for FθS (z |x1 ≤ µ) and FθK (z |x1 ≤ µ), 5 becomes:
zˆ
−∞
fθ1 (t) [2Fε (µ− t)− 1] dt > 0 ∀z
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For all s the two following properties hold: fθ1 (µ− s) = fθ1 (µ− s) , since fθ1
is symmetric around µ, and Fε (−s) = 1 − Fε (−s), since fε is symmetric around
0.
For any z ≤ µ we have that ´ z−∞ Fε (µ− t) dt > 12 so that
´ z
−∞ fθ1 (t) [2Fε (µ− t)− 1] dt >
0 ∀z ≤ µ.
For any z > µ,
zˆ
−∞
fθ1 (t) [2Fε (µ− t)− 1] dt
equals
2µ−zˆ
−∞
fθ1 (t) [2Fε (µ− t)− 1] dt
+
µˆ
2µ−z
fθ1 (t) [2Fε (µ− t)− 1] dt
+
zˆ
µ
fθ1 (t) [2Fε (µ− t)− 1] dt
The second integral on this expression, with the change of variable s = µ − t,
becomes:
0ˆ
z−µ
fθ1 (µ− s) [2Fε (s)− 1] ds =
z−µˆ
0
fθ1 (µ+ s) [2Fε (s)− 1] ds
where we use the symmetry of fθ1 . The third integral, using s = t− µ and the
symmetry of Fε, is:
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z−µˆ
0
fθ1 (µ+ s) [2Fε (−s)− 1] ds
=
z−µˆ
0
fθ1 (µ+ s) {2 [1− Fε (s)]− 1} ds
=
z−µˆ
0
fθ1 (µ+ s) [1− 2Fε (s)] ds
Thus the second and third term sum to zero. It follows that:
zˆ
−∞
fθ1 (t) [2Fε (µ− t)− 1] dt =
2µ−zˆ
−∞
fθ1 (t) [2Fε (µ− t)− 1] dt.
For any z > µ we have that
´ 2µ−z
−∞ Fε (µ− t) dt > 12 so that
´ z
−∞ fθ1 (t) [2Fε (µ− t)− 1] dt >
0 ∀z > µ.
Hence, 5 and thus proposition 1 holds. The agent will follow the recommenda-
tion ’S’ of the principal when xi1 ≤ µ.
A.3. Proof of proposition 2. In the following the superscript i will be sup-
pressed. In order to show that equation 6
FθS (z |x1 > µ)− FθK (z |x1 > µ) ≥ 0 ∀z
holds, both terms are rewritten:
FθS (z |x1 > µ) = FθS (z) =
zˆ
−∞
fθa1 (t) dt
fθK (z |x1 > µ) =
fθK (z) · Pr (x1 > µ |z )
Pr (x1 > µ)
= fθK (z) · [1− Fε (µ− z)]1− Fx1 (µ)
= 2 fθa1 (z) Fε (z − µ)
⇒ FθK
(
z
∣∣∣xi1 ≤ µ) =
zˆ
−∞
2 fθ1 (t) Fε (t− µ) dt.
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Substituting for FθS (z |x1 > µ) and FθK (z |x1 > µ), 6 becomes:
zˆ
−∞
fθa1 (t) [1− 2Fε (t− µ)] dt > 0 ∀z
Since 1 − 2Fε (t− µ) = 2Fε (µ− t) − 1 the proof in A.2 applies from here.
Hence, 6 and thus proposition 2 holds. The agent will follow the recommendation
’K’ of the
Appendix B. Appendix for Chapter 2
B.1. Proof of CLAIM 2. By De Moivre-Laplace Theorem, as N grows large
while q is constant, Pr (KN−1 = k? − 1| q) can be approximated in a neighbour-
hood of q · (N − 1) by 1√
2·pi·(N−1)·q·(1−q) · exp
{−[k?−1−q·(N−1)]2
2·(N−1)·q·(1−q)
}
, a Normal density
function. The maximum of this Normal density function (and of the probability
mass function that it is approximating) is achieved in k?−1 = q·(N − 1) and equals
1√
2·pi·(N−1)·q·(1−q) . As N → +∞, the maximum of the Normal density function ap-
proaches 0. Also, for any value of the parameters, 1 > δ · Pr (KN ≥ k?| q) ≥ 0.
The result follows. 
B.2. Proof of CLAIM 3. Compute the derivative:
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∂bFree (δ,N, q, k?)
∂q
< 0
⇔ −δ · ∂ Pr (KN ≥ k
?)
∂q
·
[
δ · k?
2 ·N · Pr (KN = k
?)
]−1
− [1− δ · Pr (KN ≥ k?)] ·
[
δ · k?
2 ·N · Pr (KN = k
?)
]−2
·δ · k
?
2 ·N ·
∂ Pr (KN = k?)
∂q
< 0
⇔
LHS︷ ︸︸ ︷
−δ ·
{
N∑
x=k?
Pr (KN = x) · [(1− q) · x+N · q − x · q]
}
<
RHS︷ ︸︸ ︷
[1− δ · Pr (KN ≥ k?)] · [(1− q) · k? +N · q − k? · q]
,
where the second equivalence follows from:
∂ Pr (KN = k?)
∂q
=
[
k? − 2 · q · k? +N · q
q · (1− q)
]
· Pr (KN = k?)
∂ Pr (KN ≥ k?)
∂q
=
N∑
x=k?
Pr (KN = x) ·
[
(1− q) · x+N · q − x · q
q · (1− q)
] .
We need to show that ∂bFree(δ,N,q,k?)
∂q
< 0 or, equivalently, that LHS < RHS.
Notice how (1− q) · x+N · q− x · q > 0, ∀q > 0. Indeed, (1− q) · x− x · q ∈ [0, x)
for q ∈ (0, 0.5]. Hence, RHS is always positive and LHS always negative. 
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